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Abstract Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a modal logic that allows to reason
about agents’ abilities in game-like scenarios. Semantic variants of ATL are usually built
upon different assumptions about the kind of game that is played, including capabilities
of agents (perfect vs. imperfect information, perfect vs. imperfect memory, etc.). ATL has
been studied extensively in previous years; however, most of the research focused on model
checking. Studies of other decision problems (e.g., satisfiability) and formal meta-properties
of the logic (like axiomatization or expressivity) have been relatively scarce, and mostly
limited to the basic variant of ATL where agents possess perfect information and perfect
memory. In particular, a comparison between different semantic variants of the logic is largely
left untouched. In this paper, we show that different semantics of ability in ATL give rise
to different validity sets. The issue is important for several reasons. First, many logicians
identify a logic with its set of true sentences. As a consequence, we prove that different
notions of ability induce different strategic logics. Secondly, we show that different concepts
of ability induce different general properties of games. Thirdly, the study can be seen as
the first systematic step towards satisfiability-checking algorithms for ATL with imperfect
information. We introduce sophisticated unfoldings of models and prove invariance results
that are an important technical contribution to formal analysis of strategic logics.
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1 Introduction
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [7,9] is a temporal logic that incorporates some basic
game theoretic notions. In ATL we can for instance express that a group of agents is able to
bring about ϕ, i.e., the agents in the group are able to enforce that property ϕ holds whatever
the other agents might do. Semantic variants of ATL are usually derived from different
assumptions about agents’ capabilities. Can the agents “see” the current state of the system,
or only a part of it? Can they memorize the whole history of observations in the game? Is
it enough that they have a way of enforcing the required temporal property “objectively”,
or should they be able to come up with the right strategy on their own? Different answers
to these questions induce different semantics of strategic ability, and they clearly give rise
to different analyses of a given game model. However, it is not entirely clear to what extent
they give rise to different logics. One natural question that arises in this respect is whether
these semantic variants generate different sets of valid (and, dually, satisfiable) sentences. In
this paper, we settle the issue and show that most “classical” semantic variants of ATL are
indeed different, and we characterize the relationship between their sets of validities.
The question is important for several reasons. First, many logicians identify a logic with
the set of sentences that are true in the logic; a semantics is just a possible way of defining
the set, alternative to an axiomatic inference system. Thus, by comparing validity sets we
compare the respective logics in the traditional sense. Secondly, validities of ATL capture
general properties of games under consideration: if, e.g., two variants of ATL generate the
same valid sentences then the underlying notions of ability induce the same kind of games.
All the variants studied here are defined over the same class of models (imperfect information
concurrent game structures) that generalizes extensive form games. The difference between
games “induced” by different semantics lies in the available strategies and the winning
conditions for them.
Thirdly, the satisfiability problem for ATL, though far less studied than model checking, is
not necessarily less important. While model checking ATL can be seen as the logical analogue
of game solving, satisfiability corresponds naturally to mechanism design. A systematic study
on the abstract level is the first step towards algorithms that solve the problem.
Our results are relevant also outside the logical context. As already mentioned, by look-
ing at validity sets we study general properties of strategic ability under various semantic
assumptions. Ultimately, we show that what agents can achieve is more sensitive to the
strategic model of an agent (and a precise notion of achievement) than it was generally
realized. No less importantly, our study reveals that some natural properties—usually taken
for granted when reasoning about temporal evolution of systems—may cease to be univer-
sally true if we change the strategic setting. Examples include fixpoint characterizations
of temporal/strategic operators (that enable incremental synthesis and iterative execution of
strategies) and the duality between necessary and obtainable outcomes in a game. The former
kind of properties is especially important for practical purposes, since fixpoint equivalences
provide the basis for most model checking and satisfiability checking algorithms. Finally,
we introduce sophisticated unfoldings of models to show invariance results with respect to
memoryless and perfect recall strategies. The unfoldings form an important technical contri-
bution of this article. We believe that their impact goes beyond ATL, as they can probably be
applied to other strategy logics. For example, it would be interesting to see which unfoldings
preserve the truth values of formulae when imperfect information is combined with strategic
commitment [66], or when explicit quantification over strategies is allowed [20,50,51].
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by presenting the relevant variants of ATL
in Sects. 2 and 3. Then we define several unfoldings of ATL models, and show that they
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preserve truth of ATL formulae under appropriate assumptions in Sect. 4. This is the most
technical part of the paper, and readers interested only in the main conceptual contribution are
advised to skip it and proceed to the next section. In Sect. 5, we show the formal relationships
between validity sets for different variants of ATL. Summary of the main results and some
conclusions are presented in Sect. 6.
About this article Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in [40,41]. The journal version
adds proofs, new results, examples, and more extensive discussions. This applies in particular
to Sect. 4 where we stress the importance of tree-like unfoldings and provide a sophisticated
construction as well as full proofs. We have also extended the results from [40,41] (formulated
mainly for the restricted language of ATL) to the more general language of ATL∗.
1.1 Related work
ATL has been studied extensively in the last 15 years. The research can be roughly divided
into the computational and conceptual strands. The former has been focused on the way
in which ATL and its extensions can be used for verification of multi-agent systems, in
particular what is the complexity of model checking, and how one can overcome the inherent
difficulties. An interested reader is referred to [13] for an overview, and to [9,17,20,24,42,
48,57,59] for more specific results; some attempts at taming the complexity were proposed
e.g. in [18,23,38,46,47]. Studies on other decision problems than model checking were
much less frequent, though satisfiability of the basic variant of ATL has been investigated
in [30,31,54,64].
The conceptual strand originally emerged in quest of the “right” semantics for strate-
gies under uncertainty. ATL was combined with epistemic logic [1,2,39,60–62], and sev-
eral semantic variants were defined that match various possible interpretations of abil-
ity [35,39,43,45,57]. Moreover, many conceptual extensions have been considered, e.g.,
with explicit reasoning about strategies, rationality assumptions and solution concepts
[19,20,58,63,65], agents with bounded resources [5,6,14,15], coalition formation and nego-
tiation [12], opponent modeling and action in stochastic environments [16,37,55,56] and
reasoning about irrevocable plans and interplay between strategies of different agents [3,11].
In the rich literature on the conceptual virtues of alternating-time temporal logic, formal
analysis is relatively scarce. Axiomatization of the basic variant of ATL was proposed in
[31], and its expressivity was addressed in [9,48]. Axiomatization of a particular variant of
imperfect information was proposed in [32]. For comparative studies, invariance of the basic
semantics with respect to a couple of classes of models was proven in [27], and the corre-
spondence between abstract and concrete models of strategic logics was the object of study in
[29,28,52]. Surprisingly, relationships between the “classical” semantic variants of ATL (as
defined e.g. in [57]) have not yet been studied, though analogous results exist that compare
more sophisticated variations to a more standard variant (cf. [36] for undominated play, [3]
for irrevocable strategies, [4] for agents with bounded memory, and [18] for recomputable
strategies under uncertainty). That means in particular that formal properties of strategic
ability under imperfect information are largely left untouched. We are trying to fill in the gap,
and start a more systematic charting of the landscape.
2 Reasoning about strategic abilities
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL [7,9] is a temporal logic that incorporates some basic
game-theoretical notions. Essentially, ATL generalizes the branching time logic CTL [21] by
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replacing path quantifiers E, A with strategic modalities 〈〈A〉〉. Informally, 〈〈A〉〉γ expresses
that the group of agents A has a collective strategy to enforce temporal property γ . ATL
formulae include temporal operators: “ ” (“in the next state”), “” (“always from now
on”), “♦” (“now or sometime in the future”), and U (“until”). Since ATL offers no way
of representing agents’ uncertainty in its models, and no operators to refer to agents’ (lack
of) knowledge in the object language, it allows to reason only about abilities of agents with
perfect information about the current global state of the system.
2.1 Syntax of ATL
In the rest of the paper we assume that  is a nonempty set of proposition symbols and Agt a
nonempty and finite set of agents. Alternating-time temporal logic comes in several syntactic
variants, of which ATL∗ is the broadest.
Definition 1 (Language of ATL*) The language of ATL∗ is given by formulae ϕ generated
by the grammar below, where A ⊆ Agt is a set of agents, and p ∈  is an atomic proposition:
ϕ : := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ,
γ : := ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | γ | γ U γ.
The “sometime” and “always” operators can be defined as ♦γ ≡ 	U γ and γ ≡ ¬♦¬γ .
Formulae ϕ are called state formulae, and γ path formulae of ATL∗. A path formula is
simple if it consists of a temporal operator followed immediately by a state subformula and
in the case of “until” the operator is also immediately preceded by a state subformula. In
other words, temporal operators have to be applied to state subformulae.
The best known syntactic variant of alternating time temporal logic is ATL in which every
occurrence of a strategic modality is immediately coupled with a temporal operator, i.e., we
have coupled operators of the form 〈〈A〉〉 , 〈〈A〉〉, and 〈〈A〉〉U . The language of ATL+
sits between ATL∗ and ATL: it allows strategic modalities to be followed by a Boolean
combination of simple temporal subformulae.
Formally, formulae of ATL are defined be the following grammar:1
ϕ: := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕ U ϕ
and ATL+ formulae by:
ϕ: := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ, γ : := ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | ϕ | ϕ U ϕ.
Example 1 The ATL formula 〈〈 jamesbond, octopussy〉〉♦kiss says that James Bond and
Octopussy can eventually kiss, no matter how the other agents act. On the other hand,
〈〈 jamesbond, jaws〉〉(¬crash ∧ ♦land) (James Bond and Jaws can prevent the space
ship from crashing and make it eventually land) is a formula of ATL+ but not ATL.
Finally, 〈〈 jamesbond〉〉♦deadBlofeld∧¬〈〈 jamesbond〉〉♦deadBlofeld is an ATL∗ for-
mula (which clearly belongs to neither ATL nor ATL+) which states that agent 007 can kill
Ernst Stavro Blofeld infinitely many times, but he cannot kill Blofeld once and forever.
2.2 Basic models of ATL
In [9], the semantics of alternating-time temporal logic is defined over a variant of transition
systems where transitions are labeled with combinations of actions, one per agent.
1 Note that “always” is not definable from “until” in ATL [48], and has to be added explicitly to the language.
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Fig. 1 Two robots and a
carriage: concurrent game
structure M0
Definition 2 (Concurrent game structure) A concurrent game structure2 (CGS) is a tuple
M = 〈Agt, St,, π, Act, d, o〉 which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt =
{1, . . . , k}, a nonempty (possibly infinite) set of states St, a set of atomic propositions 
and their valuation π :  → 2St , and a nonempty set of (atomic) actions Act. Function
d : Agt × St → 2Act defines nonempty sets of actions available to agents at each state, and o
is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state q ′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk)
to state q and a tuple of actions αi ∈ d(i, q) that can be executed by Agt in q .
Thus, we assume that all the agents execute their actions synchronously; the combination
of the actions, together with the current state, determines the next transition of the system.
In the rest of the paper, we will write di (q) instead of d(i, q), and we will denote the set
of collective choice of group A at state q by dA(q) = ∏i∈A di (q).
We will sometimes use the term pointed CGS for a pair (M, q) of a concurrent game
structure and a state in it.
Definition 3 (Path) A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . is an infinite sequence of states such that there is
a transition between each qi , qi+1. We use λ[i] to denote the i th position on path λ (starting
from i = 0) and λ[i,∞] to denote the subpath of λ starting from i . The set of paths starting
in q is denoted by ΛM(q).
Example 2 (Robots and Carriage) Consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 1. Two robots push
a carriage from opposite sides. As a result, the carriage can move clockwise or anticlockwise,
or it can remain in the same place. We assume that each robot can either push (action push)
or refrain from pushing (action wait). Moreover, they both use the same force when pushing.
Thus, if the robots push simultaneously or wait simultaneously, the carriage does not move.
When only one of the robots is pushing, the carriage moves accordingly.
To make our model of the domain discrete, we identify three different positions of the
carriage, and associate them with states q0, q1, and q2. We label the states with propositions
pos0, pos1, pos2, respectively, to allow for referring to the current position of the carriage
in the object language.
2.3 Finite versus infinite CGS
In our definition of CGS (Def. 2.2) we have not put up any requirement of finiteness with
respect to the set of states and actions. The only requirement is that the set of agents must be
2 We would like to note that it is essential for this work that we do not require a finite set of states or actions.
We give a more detailed discussion in Sect. 2.3.
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finite. In particular, we allow for infinitely many states in a model; we also allow for infinitely
branching models. In this section we shall discuss this choice in more detail.
We begin by reviewing the literature and showing that both types of CGS—finite and
infinite ones—have been considered by other authors. The semantics of ATL in concurrent
game models was originally proposed for finite structures only [9].3 Many follow-up papers
also adopted the assumption of finite models, for example [43,57] that studied variants of
ATL with imperfect information [11], which extended ATL with persistent strategies, in
[48] the expressive power of ATL is investigated, etc.
On the other hand, other authors did not restrict their analysis to the finite case, beginning
with the work on coalition logic [52,53], through comparative studies of different semantics
of ATL [26,27], the interplay between knowledge and strategies [2,39], strategic play in
the presence of intentions and commitment [3,44], and so on. Also, different formalisms
extending ATL∗ with explicit quantification over strategies follow different assumptions: on
one hand, the strategy logic by Chatterjee et al. [20] assumes models to be finite; on the other,
the strategy logic recently proposed by Mogavero et al. [51] only requires states and actions
to be countable.
As we have already stated, we assume neither St nor Act to be finite (or even enumerable).
How does that affect our work? First of all, for the new results in this article, it is especially
important that some existing technical results can be applied to infinite models. This concerns
in particular the axiomatization of ATL from [31] which was shown sound and complete
for finite as well as infinite concurrent game models. To be more precise, the authors of
[31] allow for infinitely many states, but assume that, at any state, there are only finally
many outgoing transitions. However, their results extend to the case of infinite branching in a
straightforward way. We use the axiomatization as a source of “standard” validities (like the
fixpoint characterization for 〈〈A〉〉♦), and to show that the semantics of “perfect information
memoryless ATL” and “perfect information perfect recall ATL” coincide also for infinite
models (Proposition 1). Moreover, the notion of model equivalence for ATL (alternating
bisimulation alias strategic bisimulation), while originally proposed for finite models only
[10], was extended to the unrestricted case and proved correct in [3]. We use and extend the
concept to prove invariance results for tree-like unfoldings in Sect. 4.
Secondly, all the results proposed in this paper are proved to hold if the semantics of ATL
and ATL∗ does not restrict the class of models to finite ones. More precisely, it may be possible
that one of our inclusion results between the validity sets of two logics, Val(L1) ⊆ Val(L2),
requires the existence of an infinite model. This does not mean that the theorems that we
present do not hold in the class of finite models. The latter issue, albeit interesting, is outside
of the scope of the paper. Essentially, showing that our results hold in the finite semantics
would require establishing finite model properties for the logics that we consider. To the best
of our knowledge, such properties have only been proven for the “perfect information/perfect
recall” variant of ATL [31] and ATL∗ [54]. Proving (or disproving) the finite model property
for the other variants of ATL/ATL∗ is undoubtedly important, and we would like to study it
further in the future.4
In summary:
1. our inclusion results rely on the fact that we define the semantics of ATL and ATL∗ in
both finite and infinite models; and
3 An interested reader may observe that the preliminary versions of the semantics (in alternating transition
systems) did not assume models explicitly to be finite [7,8]. However, the authors de facto considered only
finite models since they were solely interested in the model checking problem, where the input must be finite.
4 We thank an anonymous JAAMAS reviewer for suggesting this.
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2. whenever a finite model property holds for two logics under consideration, our results
comparing the two logics apply also when the semantics is restricted to finite models.
2.4 Strategies and abilities in basic semantics of ATL
ATL modalities refer to the outcome of strategic play for a given coalition. Following the
tradition of extensive form games in game theory, a strategy of agent a is understood as a plan
that specifies what a is going to do in each situation. In the standard version of ATL [7,9],
strategies are represented by functions sa : St+ → Act . Thus, it is implicitly assumed that
agents have perfect information (at each moment, they can precisely recognize the current
global state of the system) and perfect recall (they can base their choices on the whole history
of the game so far, not just the last state). Alternatively, one can assume that agents have no
memory beyond what is already contained in the current state, which gives rise to the notion
of memoryless (or positional) strategy. As we explain more systematically in Sect. 3, we will
use the notation from [57] where i (resp. I) stands for imperfect (resp. perfect) information,
and r (resp. R) for imperfect (resp. perfect) recall.
Definition 4 (IR- and Ir-strategies) Let M be a CGS over states St and actions Act. A
perfect information perfect recall strategy for agent a in M (IR-strategy in short) is a function
sa : St+ → Act such that sa(q0q1 . . . qn) ∈ da(qn). The set of such strategies is denoted by
	IRa .
A perfect information memoryless strategy for agent a in M (Ir -strategy in short) is a
function sa : St → Act where sa(q) ∈ da(q). The set of such strategies is denoted by 	Ira .
A collective strategy for a group of agents A = {a1, . . . , ar } is simply a tuple of individual
strategies sA = 〈sa1 , . . . , sar 〉. The set of such strategies is denoted by 	IRA (for IR strategies)
and 	IrA (for Ir strategies, respectively).5
The “outcome” function out (q, sA) returns the set of all paths that may occur when agents
A execute strategy sA from state q onward. Let a ∈ A; by sA|a , we denote agent a’s part sa
of the collective strategy sA.
Definition 5 (Outcome) The outcome outM(q, sA) of an IR -strategy sA from state q in
model M is the set of all paths λ = q0q1q2 . . . such that q0 = q and for each i = 1, 2, . . . there
exists a tuple of agents’ decisions 〈αi−1a1 , . . . , αi−1ak 〉 such that: (i) αi−1a ∈ da(qi−1) for every
a ∈ Agt, (ii) αi−1a = sA|a(q0q1 . . . qi−1) for every a ∈ A, and (iii) o(qi−1, αi−1a1 , . . . , αi−1ak )= qi .
The outcome outM(q, sA) of an Ir-strategy sA is defined analogously but sA|a(q0q1 . . .
qi−1) is replaced by sA|a(qi−1).
Often, we will omit the subscript “M” if it is clear from the context.
Let M be a CGS, q a state, and λ a path in M. Now, the semantics of ATL∗ and its
sublanguages can be defined by the following clauses [9]:
M, q | p iff q ∈ π(p), for p ∈ ;
M, q | ¬ϕ iff M, q | ϕ;
M, q | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, q | ϕ1 and M, q | ϕ2;
5 As commonly done we assume an implicit order on the elements in Agt allowing to conveniently represent
collective strategies as tuples. In our setting where agents are represented by natural numbers the order is
apparent. In the general case, a collective strategy for A is a function that associates individual strategies to
the agents in A.
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M, q | 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is an IR-strategy sA for agents A such that for each path
λ ∈ out (q, sA), we have M, λ | γ .
M, λ | ϕ iff M, λ[0] | ϕ;
M, λ | ¬γ iff M, λ | γ ;
M, λ | γ1 ∧ γ2 iff M, λ | γ1 and M, λ | γ2;
M, λ | γ iff M, λ[1,∞] | γ ; and
M, λ | γ1 U γ2 iff there is an i ∈ N0 such that M, λ[i,∞] | γ2 and M, λ[ j,∞] | γ1
for all 0 ≤ j < i .
Example 3 (Robots and Carriage, ctd.) Since the outcome of each robot’s action depends
on the current action of the other robot, no robot can make sure that the carriage moves
to any particular position. So, we have for example that M0, q0 | ¬〈〈1〉〉♦pos1. On
the other hand, the robots can cooperate to move the carriage. For instance, it holds that
M0, q0 | 〈〈1, 2〉〉♦pos1 (example strategy: robot 1 always pushes and robot 2 always waits).
Moreover, single robots can play strategically to avoid the carriage entering a particular
position: M0, q0 | 〈〈1〉〉¬pos1 (the strategy: wait in q0 and push in q2).
Note that the semantics does not address the issue of coordination between members of
the coalition [25,34]: if there exist several successful joint strategies for A, the agents in A
are assumed to somehow choose between them.
Finally, validity and satisfiability in ATL are defined in the standard way.
Definition 6 (Validity and satisfiability) Formula ϕ is valid in model M iff it holds in every
state of M, i.e., M, q | ϕ for every q ∈ StM. The formula is valid in a class of models C iff
it is valid in every model from C.
Dually, ϕ is satisfiable in a class of models C iff there exists M ∈ C and a state q in M
such that M, q | ϕ.
2.5 Some important validites
We recall that the following fixpoint properties are valid in the basic semantics of ATL
presented in Sect. 2.4:
〈〈A〉〉ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕ
〈〈A〉〉♦ϕ ↔ ϕ ∨ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉♦ϕ
〈〈A〉〉ϕ1 U ϕ2 ↔ ϕ2 ∨ ϕ1 ∧ 〈〈A〉〉 〈〈A〉〉ϕ1 U ϕ2.
Validity of these formulae was demonstrated in [9] for finite models, and in [31] for finitely
branching models (with possibly infinitely many states). It is easy to check that the argument
extends to models with infinite branching.
The intuitive meaning of the fixpoint equivalences is that planning for a long-term goal
(like achieving ϕ eventually, or maintaining ϕ persistently) can be decomposed into finding a
good opening move and a suitable follow-up. Such properties are crucial for building model
checking and satisfiability checking algorithms, and in particular they allow for incremental
iterative synthesis of strategies.
Moreover, the path quantifiers A, E of CTL can be expressed in the standard semantics
of ATL with 〈〈∅〉〉, 〈〈Agt〉〉 respectively. Again, checking this is routine, even for models with
infinitely many states and infinite branching. As a consequence, the CTL duality axioms can
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be rewritten in ATL, and become validities in the basic semantics:
¬〈〈Agt〉〉 ϕ ↔ 〈〈∅〉〉 ¬ϕ
¬〈〈Agt〉〉♦ϕ ↔ 〈〈∅〉〉¬ϕ,
¬〈〈∅〉〉♦ϕ ↔ 〈〈Agt〉〉¬ϕ.
We observe that all the properties presented in this subsection are schemes, rather than
single formulae, and allow for uniform substitution. More precisely, ϕ can be replaced by
any state formula of ATL, and the resulting formula is a validity of ATL. Moreover, ϕ in
the duality axioms can be replaced by any state or path formula of ATL∗, and the resulting
formula is a validity of ATL∗.
3 Semantic variants: uncertainty and recall
As we already pointed out in Sect. 2.4, one can distinguish between two types of strategies:
an agent may base its decision on the current state or on the whole history of states that have
occurred. Also, the agent may have complete or incomplete knowledge about the current
global state of the system throughout the game. A number of semantic variations have been
proposed for ATL, e.g. [3,4,35,39,43,45,57]. In this paper, we study the “canonical” variants
as proposed in [57]. There, a natural taxonomy of four strategy types was introduced and
labeled as follows: R (resp. r) stands for perfect (resp. imperfect) recall, and I (resp. i) refers
to perfect (resp. imperfect) information. The semantics of ATL, ATL+ and ATL∗ can be
parameterized with the strategy type—yielding four different semantic variants of the logic,
labeled accordingly (ATLIR, ATLIr , ATLiR, ATLir , etc.).
In this paper, we extend the taxonomy with a distinction between objective and subjective
abilities under imperfect information, denoted by io and is , respectively; the distinction can
be traced back to [35,39,43,45]. Intuitively, subjective ability to bring about γ means that
the agents are able to both identify and execute the right strategy, i.e., they not only can
play to achieve γ ; they also know how to do it. Objective ability is a weaker property: the
agents could execute the right strategy, but they do not necessarily know which one works
out, and they might be even unaware that such a strategy exists. Examples of agents who have
objective but not subjective ability to achieve their goals include: garbage collecting robots
that execute a strategy (program) provided by the producer, a Master’s student executing a
strategy hinted by his/her supervisor, etc.
The distinction between perfect and imperfect recall (R vs. r) is reflected in the type of
function used to represent strategies (St+ → Act vs. St → Act). The distinction between
perfect and imperfect information (I vs. i) yields constraints on the set of functions that
represent “feasible” strategies. The additional refinement of the imperfect information case
(io vs. is) determines which outcome paths will be taken into account when evaluating the
success of a strategy.
3.1 Imperfect information models and strategies
Models, imperfect information concurrent game structures (iCGS) [57,61], are concurrent
game structures augmented with a family of indistinguishability relations ∼a⊆ St × St, one
per agent a ∈ Agt. The relations describe agents’ uncertainty: q ∼a q ′ means that agent
a cannot distinguish between states q and q ′ of the system. Each ∼a is assumed to be an
equivalence relation. It is also required that agents have the same choices in indistinguishable
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states. Note that CGS’s can be seen as the subclass of iCGS’s where all ∼a are the minimal
reflexive relations. Formally, we have:
Definition 7 (iCGS) An imperfect information concurrent game structure (iCGS) is given
by
M = 〈Agt, St,, π, Act, d, o, {∼a | a ∈ Agt}〉
where 〈Agt, St,, π, Act, d, o〉 is a CGS, each ∼a⊆ St × St is an equivalence relation, and
if q ∼a q ′ then d(a, q) = d(a, q ′).
Definition 8 (Histories, h ≈ h′, last (h), ◦, |h|) A history is a finite sequence of states that
can be effected by subsequent transitions. Two histories h = q0q1 . . . qn and h′ = q ′0q ′1 . . . q ′n′
are indistinguishable for agent a (h ≈a h′) iff n = n′ and qi ∼a q ′i for i = 0, . . . , n.
Concatenation of h and h′ is denoted by h ◦ h′ or simply hh′. We also use last (h) to refer to
the last state on history h, and |h| to denote the length of h (i.e., the number of states in h). As
for paths, we use h[i, j], i ≤ j , i < |h|, to refer to the subhistory h[i] . . . h[min( j, |h|− 1)].
We do also allow j = ∞. We define Λ f inM (q) as the set of all histories in M starting from
q , i.e., all the finite prefixes of paths in ΛM(q). Moreover, Λ f inM :=
⋃
q∈St Λ
f in
M (q) denotes
the set of all histories in M.
Additionally, for any equivalence relation R over a set X we use [x]R to denote the
equivalence class of x . Moreover, we use the abbreviations ∼A:= ⋃a∈A ∼a and ≈A:=⋃
a∈A ≈a . We also write ∼MA and ≈MA if the model is not clear from the context. Note that
relations ∼A and ≈A implement the “everybody knows” type of collective knowledge (i.e.,
q and q ′ are indistinguishable for group A iff there is at least one agent in A for whom q and
q ′ look the same).
Definition 9 (ir-, iR-strategies) An imperfect information memoryless strategy (ir-strategy
in short) is an Ir-strategy satisfying the following additional constraint: if q ∼a q ′ then
sa(q) = sa(q ′).
An imperfect information perfect recall strategy (iR-strategy in short) of agent a is an
IR-strategy such that, if h ≈a h′, then sa(h) = sa(h′).
That is, strategy sa is a conditional plan that specifies a’s action in each state of the system
(for memoryless agents) or for every possible history of the system evolution (for agents
with perfect recall). Moreover, imperfect information strategies specify the same choices for
indistinguishable states (resp. histories).
Example 4 (Robots and Carriage, ctd.) We refine the scenario from Example 2 by restricting
perception of the robots. Namely, we assume that robot 1 is only able to observe the color of
the surface on which it is standing, and robot 2 perceives only the texture (cf. Fig. 2a). As a
consequence, the first robot can distinguish between position 0 and position 1, but positions
0 and 2 look the same to it. Likewise, the second robot can distinguish between positions 0
and 2, but not 0 and 1 (cf. Fig. 2b).
Note that the strategy from Example 3 cannot be used anymore because it is not uniform
(indeed, the strategy tells robot 1 to wait in q0 and push in q2 but both states look the same
to the robot).
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(A) (B)
Fig. 2 Two robots and a carriage: a schematic view; b an imperfect information concurrent game structure
M ′0 that models the scenario. Dashed lines represent indistinguishability relations between states
3.2 Subjective epistemic outcome
Assumptions about agents’ (un)certainty (i.e. the distinction between I and i) and recall (i.e.
the distinction between R and r ) are encoded in the mathematical structures that are used to
represent strategies. However, if agent a is to make sure that a strategy sa enforces property
γ , it is not sufficient to consider only the paths from out (q, sa) because a does not necessarily
know that q is the current state. To know that sa guarantees γ , agent a should also check
the outcome paths starting from states indistinguishable from q . From a conceptual point of
view it makes sense to define two types of ability under imperfect information. Objective
ability (io) means that a has an executable winning strategy, but the agent may be unaware
of that, or be unable to identify the strategy on her own. Subjective ability (is) requires that
a has a winning strategy and that a can identify such a strategy, i.e., the agents knows how
to play and not only that a good way of playing exists.
On the semantic side, this is reflected by the set of paths that are taken into account.
Objective ability refers to the outcome paths that can objectively happen, while subjective
ability builds on the outcome paths that are subjectively possible according to a’s available
information.6
Definition 10 (Subjective epistemic outcome, x-outcome) Let M be an iCGS, q a state
in it and sA a collective strategy for group A ⊆ Agt. Let x ∈ {is, io, I }. The x-outcome
outxM(q, sA) is defined as follows:
outxM(q, sA) =
{⋃
q∼Aq ′ outM(q
′, sA) if x = is;
outM(q, sA) else.
Again, we omit M if it is clear from context.
Example 5 (Robots and Carriage) In the scenario from Example 4, a possible uniform strat-
egy of robot 1 is to push in q0 and q2, and wait in q1. If the starting state is q0 then the
strategy objectively makes sure that the system will never move to q2. However, robot 1 does
not know that the strategy is successful in avoiding q2 since he must take into account also
the outcome paths starting from q2 which trivially violate the path property ¬pos2. Thus,
1 has the objective, but not the subjective, ability to enforce ¬pos2 in state q0.
6 The issue is closely related to epistemic feasibility of plans, cf. e.g. [22,49].
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In order to ensure a uniform notation, we introduce xy-strategies for x ∈ {is, io, I } and
y ∈ {r, R} as follows:
IR: sa : St+ → Act such that sa(q0 . . . qn) ∈ d(a, qn) for all q0, . . . , qn ;
Ir: sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q) for all q;
ior, isr: like Ir, with the additional constraint that q ∼a q ′ implies sa(q) = sa(q ′);
ioR, isR: like IR, with the additional constraint that h ≈a h′ implies sa(h) = sa(h′).
As before, collective xy-strategies sA are tuples of individual xy-strategies sa , one per a ∈ A.
We emphasize that is y- and io y-strategies are defined in the very same way, only the notion of
outcome is different. Note also that the constraints in collective strategies refer to individual
choices and individual relations ∼a (resp. ≈a), and not to collective choices and the derived
relations ∼A (resp. ≈A).
3.3 Unified setting: xy-semantics of ATL
Finally, we put the pieces together and define the semantics of ATLxy, ATL+xy, and ATL∗xy
for x ∈ {is, io, I } and y ∈ {r, R} by changing the clause for 〈〈A〉〉γ from Sect. 2.4 in the
following way:
M, q |xy 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is an xy-strategy sA for agents A such that for each path
λ ∈ out x (q, sA), we have M, λ |xy γ .
Note, again, that the I and io semantics look only at outcome paths starting from the
current global state of the system. In contrast, the is semantics of 〈〈A〉〉γ refers to all outcome
paths starting from states that look the same as the current state for coalition A. Hence, it
formalizes the notion of A knowing how to play in the sense that A can identify a single
strategy that succeeds from all the states they consider possible. We follow [57] by taking
the “everybody knows” interpretation of collective uncertainty. More general settings were
proposed in [39,43]. We believe that the results in this paper carry over to the other cases of
“knowing how to play”, too.
Example 6 (Robots and Carriage, ctd.) Consider the modified robots scenario from Exam-
ple 4 (Fig. 2). With observational capabilities of the robots restricted in this way, no agent
knows how to make the carriage reach or avoid any selected state singlehandedly from
q0, i.e., M ′0, q0 |isy ¬〈〈i〉〉♦posj and M ′0, q0 |isy ¬〈〈i〉〉¬posj for all y ∈ {r, R}, i ∈{1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note in particular that the strategy from Example 3 cannot be used
here because it is not uniform, and the strategy from Example 5 does not succeed because
of outcome paths from indistinguishable states. Still, the latter strategy can be used to
demonstrate that robot 1 has the objective ability to avoid q2 (though not q1 anymore):
M ′0, q0 |ioy 〈〈1〉〉¬pos2 ∧ ¬〈〈i〉〉¬pos1.
The robots can keep the carriage away from pos1 together, but only in the objective sense:
M ′0, q0 |ioy 〈〈1, 2〉〉¬pos1. However, they cannot identify a strategy which guarantees that:
M ′0, q0 |isy ¬〈〈1, 2〉〉¬pos1 (when in q0, robot 2 considers it possible that the system is
already in the “bad” state q1). So, do the robots know how to play to achieve anything? Yes,
for example they know how to make the carriage reach a given state eventually: M ′0, q0 |isy〈〈1, 2〉〉♦pos1 etc.—it suffices that one of the robots pushes all the time and the other waits
all the time.
For the above properties the type of robots’ recall does not matter (they hold in both mem-
oryless and perfect recall strategies). 〈〈1, 2〉〉♦pos1 is an example formula that distinguishes
between the two sets of strategies. Note that M ′0, q0 |ior ¬〈〈1, 2〉〉♦pos1: the robots have
no memoryless strategy to bring the carriage to pos1 and keep it there forever, even in the
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objective sense. Still, they have a successful perfect recall strategy for that, and are able to
identify it: M ′0, q0 |isR 〈〈1, 2〉〉♦pos1. The right strategy is that one robot pushes and the
other waits for the first 3 steps. After that, they know their current position exactly, and can
go straight to position 1 and stay there.
3.4 Folk result: memory does not matter for perfect information
We observe that the basic semantics of ATL∗ from [9] corresponds exactly to ATL∗IR. A folk
result states that, in the restricted language of ATL both semantics for perfect information
coincide. That is, exactly the same formulae characterize models and their states in ATLIR
and ATLIr .
Proposition 1 For every iCGS M, state q, and ATL formula ϕ, we have that M, q |IR ϕ
iff M, q |Ir ϕ.
Proof For finite models, equivalence of the semantics has been observed in [57], and follows
from correctness of the model checking algorithm presented in [9]. It is not entirely obvious,
however, that the result should extend to the infinite case. We present our own proof sketch
below.
First, we observe that ATLIR and ATLIr have the same validities. This follows from the
results in [3] showing that: (1) perfect recall strategies in a CGS correspond to memoryless
strategies in its tree unfolding, (2) every pointed CGS is strategically bisimilar to its tree
unfolding, and (3) the same formulae of ATLIr hold in strategically bisimilar models (cf. also
a more detailed exposition in Sect. 4.1).
Now we can prove the equivalence of M, q |IR ϕ and M, q |Ir ϕ by induction over the
structure of ϕ. Cases ϕ ≡ p,¬ψ,ψ1 ∧ψ2, 〈〈A〉〉 ψ are straightforward. For ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ ,
we take the axiom schemes (FP) and (GFP) from [31]. It was proved in [31] that all their
instances are validities of ATLIR.7 By the previous observation, all the instances of schemes
(FP) and (GFP) are validities of ATLIr too. But that means that 〈〈A〉〉 is the greatest
fixpoint of the same monotone transformer of state sets in both semantics |IR and |Ir . Thus,
the set of states satisfying 〈〈A〉〉ψ in M is the same in both semantics.
The proof for 〈〈A〉〉ψ1 U ψ2 is analogous, by showing that its extension in |IR and |Ir is
the least fixpoint of the same monotone transformer of state subsets from M. unionsq
Note that the IR and Ir semantics coincide only for the restricted syntactic variant ATL.
For ATL∗, and even ATL+, there are formulae that distinguish the two semantics, as we
demonstrate in Sect. 5.1.
4 Perfect recall and tree-like unfoldings
Now we can turn to the original contribution of this paper. We begin by preparing the formal
ground for our comparison of ATL validities under different semantics. In this section, we
define several tree-like unfoldings of models, and show that they preserve truth of ATL
formulae provided appropriate assumptions about agents’ uncertainty and notion of success.
This is the most technical part of the paper, needed mostly to prove the inclusion results in
Sect. 5.1. However, its importance goes beyond technicalities. The unfoldings uncover some
7 The proof in [31] was for the class of finitely branching CGS (with possibly infinite state spaces) but it
extends to the case of infinite branching in a straightforward way.
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of the conceptual structure that underlies ATL. In particular, they expose a “forgetting”
phenomenon in the semantics of ATL: even agents with perfect recall are assumed to forget
their past observations when proceeding to a subtask specified by a nested subformula (like in
〈〈a〉〉♦〈〈a〉〉p). In a way, one can talk about two variants of perfect recall: the “almost perfect
recall” where agents use perfect recall strategies but abandon their previous observations when
trying to enforce a nested strategic formula, and “truly perfect recall” where their hitherto
observations carry over to the nested strategic task. On the other hand, our invariance theorems
show that alternating-time temporal logic (even in its broadest syntactic variant ATL∗) is too
poor to distinguish between the two kinds of recall.
We believe that this section is of interest to readers who are intrigued by intricacies of
game logics or search for tools that can be used to prove similar invariance results. On the
other hand, readers interested only in the main conceptual contribution of this paper (i.e.,
the comparison of validities for variants of ATL) are advised to skip this part and proceed
to Sect. 5.
Plan of Sect. 4 A tree-like unfolding of an iCGS is an (infinite) model in which nodes
correspond to finite sequences of states (i.e., histories) in the original iCGS. It is easy to see
that the underlying transition structure of such an unfolding is a tree or a forest. The advantage
of these structures is that perfect recall strategies and memoryless strategies coincide in tree-
like unfoldings. Moreover, each perfect recall strategy in the original model corresponds to
a memoryless strategy in the unfolding yielding an equivalent outcome, and vice versa. Both
properties are rather standard in the perfect information setting. For imperfect information,
however, the constructions are more involved due to the specialities of the iR-semantics;
more precisely, the knowledge of agents is “reset” whenever a nested strategic modality is
evaluated.
For each of the three semantic settings of:
– perfect information,
– imperfect information with the objective semantics,
– imperfect information with the subjective semantics,
we proceed as follows:
1. We characterise appropriate tree-like structures and show that memoryless and perfect
recall strategies coincide on them.
2. We define appropriate unfoldings and show that they result in tree-like structures.
3. We show that the unfoldings are truth-preserving (i.e. a formula which is true in the
original model is also true in the tree-like unfolding and vice versa).
4.1 Perfect information
We begin with tree unfoldings of perfect information CGS’s. We draw inspiration from the
proof of [3, Theorem 8.3].
Definition 11 (Tree-like CGS, ρM(q1, q2)) Let M be a CGS. M is called tree-like iff there
is a state q0 (the root) such that for every q there is a unique history leading from q0 to q .
Let q1 and q2 be states in M. If q2 is reachable from q1 then we use ρM(q1, q2) to refer
to the unique history from state q1 to q2; otherwise, if q2 is not reachable from q1 we set
ρM(q1, q2) = . Moreover, we use ρM(q) as a shortcut for ρM(q0, q) (we will omit the
subscript if clear from context). We note that ρM(q0) = q0.
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Every state q in a tree-like CGS uniquely determines the path that leads from the root to
q . Hence, perfect recall is already included in the states of the model. This is formally shown
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Recall invariance for tree-like CGS) For every tree-like CGS M, state q in
M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ, we have: M, q |Ir ϕ iff M, q |IR ϕ.
Proof The proof is done by induction over the structure of ϕ.
Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ contains no nested strategic modalities. The left-to-right
direction is obvious. Now suppose that M, q |IR 〈〈A〉〉γ and let sA be a collective IR-
strategy for A such that for all λ ∈ out (q, sA) it holds that M, λ |IR γ . We define
tA(q ′) = sA(ρ(q, q ′)) for each state q ′ in M reachable from q . Then, tA is a well-defined
Ir-strategy with out (q, tA) = out (q, sA). Hence, we have M, q |Ir 〈〈A〉〉γ .
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . M, q |Ir ¬ψ iff not M, q |Ir ψ iff (by induction hypothesis) not
M, q |IR ψ iff M, q |IR ¬ψ .
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ . We observe that each state q ′ at which a state subformula ψ of γ is
evaluated forms the root of a tree-like CGS. Then, by induction, ψ has the same truth
value in q ′ according to the IR- and Ir-semantics and can be replaced by a new atomic
proposition with the appropriate valuation. This yields formula ϕ′ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ ′ with no
nested strategic modalities, to which we apply the same argument as above. unionsq
A natural question is whether every model has an equivalent tree-like CGS. By “equiv-
alent” we mean that the sets of formulae which hold at corresponding states are always the
same.
Definition 12 (Tree unfolding) Let M = (Agt, St,, π, Act, d, o) be a CGS and q be a
state in it. The (perfect information) tree unfolding of the pointed model (M, q) denoted
T (M, q) is defined as (Agt, St′,, π ′, Act, d ′, o′) where
– St′ := Λ f inM (q),
– d ′(a, h) := d(a, last (h)),
– o′(h,α) := h ◦ o(last (h),α), and
– π ′(h) := π(last (h)).
The node q in the unfolding is called the root of T (M, q).
An example tree unfolding is shown in Fig. 3. It is important to note that histories in M
are states in T (M, q) and that each tree unfolding is tree-like:
Proposition 3 The tree unfolding of a pointed CGS (M, q) is tree-like.
We now show that satisfaction of ATL∗-formulae is invariant under tree unfoldings and
that memory is not needed in the tree unfolding.
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Fig. 3 Tree unfolding T (M0, q0) for the robots and carriage CGS from Fig. 1
Theorem 1 For every CGS M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ we have:8
M, q |IR ϕ iff T (M, q), q |IR ϕ iff T (M, q), q |Ir ϕ.
Proof The second equivalence follows from Propositions 2 and 3. To prove the first equiva-
lence we show that, for all h ∈ Λ f inM (q), we have M, last (h) |IR ϕ iff T (M, q), h |IR ϕ
(by induction over the structure of ϕ). Note that for each state q ′ reachable from q in M there
is a history h such that last (h) = q ′.
Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ does not contain any strategic modalities.
“⇒”: Suppose that M, last (h) |IR ϕ. Then, there is an IR-strategy sA such that for
all λ ∈ out (last (h), sA) we have that M, λ | γ . Now let tA be an Ir-strategy defined
as follows: tA(hh′) = sA(last (h)h′), and arbitrary otherwise. By definition of the tree
unfolding and the construction of tA we have that
last (h)q1q2 · · · ∈ outM(last (h), sA) iff
(h)(hq1)(hq1q2) · · · ∈ outT (M,q)(h, tA).
Since the valuation of propositions only depends on the final state of a history and since Ir-
strategies can be seen as special cases of IR-strategies, we have also that T (M, q), h |IR
ϕ.
“⇐”: Suppose that T (M, q), h |IR ϕ. Then, by Propositions 2 and 3, there is an Ir-
strategy sA such that for all λ ∈ out (h, sA) we have that T (M, q), λ | γ . We define the
following IR-strategy tA:
tA(h′) =
{
sA(h(h′[1,∞])) if h′[0] = last (h)
α else, for some arbitrary α ∈ dA(last (h′))
8 The equivalence of M, q |IR ϕ and T (M, q), q |IR ϕ follows also from the results on alternating
bisimulation, cf. [10] for the bisimulation in finite models, and [3] for the general case. We present the
construction nevertheless, as it will be adapted in the following sections to the case of imperfect information.
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The first case of the definition tA applies if h′[1,∞], i.e. h′ without the initial state, is
a possible extension of history h. The history h(h′[1,∞]) is the extension of h with h′
where the last state of h or the initial state of h′ has to be removed as it occurs twice.
Again, we have
last (h)q1q2 · · · ∈ outM(last (h), tA) iff
(h)(hq1)(hq1q2) · · · ∈ outT (M,q)(h, sA)
and thus M, last (h) |IR ϕ.
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ . We observe that for each state q ′ in M reachable from q at which a
state-subformula ϕ′ of γ is evaluated there is a history h such that T (M, q) contains a
state hq ′ at which the very subformula holds (by induction hypothesis). Then we apply
the same reasoning as for the case with no nested strategic modalities. unionsq
4.2 Imperfect information: objective ability
Unlike in the perfect information case, tree unfoldings for imperfect information must also
take into account the indistinguishability relations. We construct our argument for the io case
similarly to Sect. 4.1. The notion of tree-like imperfect information CGS has to include
suitable constraints on the epistemic relations—otherwise we would not get truth invariance
with respect to recall. To handle the issue, we introduce objective epistemic tree unfoldings
under perfect recall, or ioR-tree unfoldings in short.
Definition 13 (Tree structure of iCGS) Let M be an iCGS. M has tree structure iff the
underlying CGS of M (i.e., M without epistemic relations) is tree-like. As in Definition 11
we use ρM(q1, q2) to refer to the unique history between q1 and q2 in M if it exists and set
ρM(q) = ρM(q0, q) where q0 is the root in M. Again, we omit M from ρM(·) if clear from
context.
Definition 14 (io R-tree-like) Let M be an iCGS with tree structure. M is called ioR-tree-like
iff for all a ∈ Agt and all q1, q2 ∈ St we have q1 ∼Ma q2 iff ρ(q1) ≈Ma ρ(q2). (We note that
ρ(q1) ≈Ma ρ(q2) implies q1 ∼Ma q2 by definition of ≈Ma .)
In other words, in an ioR-tree-like structure the information sets in a game can only be
more precise when the game already follows some previous interaction. The next proposition
is analogous to Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 (Recall invariance for ioR-tree-like models) For every ioR-tree-like iCGS M,
state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ, we have that M, q |ior ϕ iff M, q |ioR ϕ.
Proof Induction over the structure of ϕ.
Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ contains no strategic modalities. The left-to-right direction is
obvious. Now suppose that M, q |ioR 〈〈A〉〉γ and let sA be a collective iR-strategy for A
such that for allλ ∈ out (q, sA) it holds thatM, λ |ioR γ . We define ta(q ′) = sa(ρ(q, q ′))
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Fig. 4 ioR-tree unfolding To(M ′0, q0) of the robots with limited information from Fig. 2 (we omitted reflexive
epistemic links)
for each state q ′ in M which is reachable from q . Then, we have out (q, tA) = out (q, sA).
Moreover, we have for all states q1 and q2 and all agents a ∈ Agt that q1 ∼a q2 iff
ρ(q1) ≈a ρ(q2) because: (a) the right-to-left direction is clear from the definition of
≈, and (b) the left-to-right direction follows because M is ioR-tree-like. Hence, tA is a
well-defined ior-strategy with out (q, tA) = out (q, sA) and thus: M, q |ior 〈〈A〉〉γ .
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . M, q |ior ¬ψ iff not M, q |ior ψ iff (by induction hypothesis) not
M, q |ioR ψ iff M, q |ioR ¬ψ .
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ . We observe that each state q ′ at which a state subformula ψ of γ is
evaluated forms the root of a ioR-tree-like iCGS. Then, by induction, ψ has the same
truth value in q ′ according to the ioR- and ior-semantics and can be replaced by a new
atomic proposition with the appropriate valuation. This yields formula ϕ′ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ ′ with
no nested strategic modalities, to which we apply the same argument as above. unionsq
Now, the ioR-tree unfolding is defined as standard tree unfolding for the perfect information
case extended with indistinguishability relations between histories of the model (which are
nodes of the unfolding).
Definition 15 (io R-tree unfolding) Given an iCGS M and a state q in it, we define the
ioR-tree unfolding of (M, q), denoted To(M, q), as T (M, q) from Definition 12 extended
with epistemic relations ∼To(M,q)a reflecting indistinguishability of histories in M; that is,
h ∼To(M,q)a h′ iff h ≈Ma h′ where h and h′ start in q .
As an example, the ioR-tree unfolding of the robots and carriage iCGS is presented in
Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5 “Poor duck model” M1 with one player (a) and transitions labeled with a’s actions. The dotted
line depicts a’s indistinguishability relation. Automatic transitions (i.e., such that there is only one possible
transition from the starting state) are left unlabeled
Proposition 5 Let (M, q) be a pointed iCGS. The ioR-tree unfolding of (M, q) is ioR-tree-
like.
Proof Clearly, the unfolding has tree structure and is ioR-tree-like by definition of the indis-
tinguishability relations in the ioR-tree-unfolding. unionsq
Analogously to Theorem 1 we have that ioR-tree unfoldings are truth preserving and that
memory does not matter in these unfolded models.
Theorem 2 For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ we have:
M, q |ioR ϕ iff To(M, q), q |ioR ϕ iff To(M, q), q |ior ϕ.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
4.3 Imperfect information: subjective ability
The case for the subjective semantics (is) cannot be proven in the same way by using ioR-
tree unfoldings. Obviously, when constructing an unfolding of (M, q) for the isR-semantics
one has to take into account paths starting from states indistinguishable from q . A first
naive approach could be to define the isR-unfolding as a structure consisting of ioR-tree
unfoldings, one for each epistemic alternative, and to connect the root nodes of all these
unfoldings. Unfortunately, this simple idea is not sufficient as illustrated in Example 7.
Example 7 (First naive approach to isR-tree unfoldings) We consider the iCGS M1 shown
in Fig. 5. The story is as follows. A man wants to shoot down a yellow rubber duck in a
shooting gallery. The man knows that the duck is in one of the two cells in front of him,
but he does not know in which one. He can shoot to the left (action shootL ) or to the right
(shootR). Alternatively, he can reach out and open one of the cells for a moment (action
look), thus removing his uncertainty.
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Fig. 6 Two ioR-tree unfoldings connected by epistemic links. Each label i1i2 . . . refers to the history qi1 qi2 . . .
Let us take the ioR-tree unfoldings To(M1, q0) and To(M1, q1), and interconnect their
nodes by epistemic links whenever the corresponding histories are indistinguishable in the
original model. The resulting model is shown in Fig. 6 (we will call the model T1). Unfor-
tunately, this construction is not truth-preserving. That is because if a state-subformula is
evaluated in states 040 and 151 of T1 the agent will know where the game is—which is not
consistent with the is semantics: only the last state of each history should be considered.
To be more precise, let us consider formula ϕ = 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 shot. Clearly, we
have M1, q0 |isR ϕ. On the other hand, we have T1, q0 |isR ϕ.
In order to improve the naive approach one may simply add an epistemic link between
states 040 and 151. Unfortunately, this does not work either. Such a link indicates that the
states 040 and 151 are indistinguishable for a; on the other hand, player a can distinguish
the histories which lead to these states. This contradicts the conceptual idea in which states
are associated with histories. Moreover, it is easy to construct a concrete counterexample.
To make the observation in Example 7 more formal, suppose hq is some node in the ioR-
tree unfolding To(M, q0) and that in this node a formula 〈〈a〉〉γ is evaluated. Then, 〈〈a〉〉γ holds
iff agent a has a successful iR-strategy not only for all paths starting from hq , but also for
paths starting from nodes h′q ′ such that q ∼Ma q ′. In the ioR-tree unfolding, however, these
nodes are usually not linked via an epistemic transition. On the other hand, we cannot simply
introduce the link hq ∼To(M,q0)a h′q ′ as we would loose soundness of the construction (in
general, h and h′ do not need to be indistinguishable). This observation makes it necessary to
introduce a more sophisticated construction for the subjective epistemic tree-like unfoldings
under perfect recall, or isR-pando unfoldings in short.9
Firstly, we discuss when an iCGS should be considered isR-pando-like. The idea of a set
of connected ioR-tree-like models (like in Example 7) seems to come close. However, we
should also account for the “forgetting” of the history of the play when a nested strategic
operator is evaluated. This is because if a state subformula (like 〈〈a〉〉γ ) is evaluated in a
history h, only the last state of h is relevant. The rest of h is “lost” as it does not influence
the truth of 〈〈a〉〉γ in h. We deal with it by adding appropriate “hanging” trees with roots q
that are indistinguishable from last (h) in the original models. The new trees are connected
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer of JAAMAS for the excellent terminological suggestion. An isR unfolding
is not a tree, as it usually consists of several transition trees. On the other hand, it is not a typical forest because
the trees are not separate—they are intimately connected by epistemic relations. For the biological Pando, see
for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pando(tree).
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to histories in the “basic” tree by appropriate epistemic links. We must also make sure that
there are no epistemic links between such trees apart from the ones just explained.
Definition 16 (is R-pando-like, ρM(q, q ′)) An iCGS
M = 〈Agt, St,, π, Act, d, o, {∼a}a∈Agt〉
is isR-pando-like iff it consists of submodels
Mi = 〈Agt, Sti ,, πi , Act, di , oi , {∼Mia }a∈Agt〉
for i ∈ I and some index set I ⊆ N, where:
– each Mi is an ioR-tree-like iCGS,
– St = ⊎i∈I Sti (i.e. the states of the Mi ’s form a partition of M),
– π : St → 2 with π(q) = πi (q) for q ∈ Sti ,
– d : St × Agt → 2Act with d(q, a) = di (q, a) for q ∈ Sti ,
– o : St × Act|Agt| → St with o(q, α) = oi (q, α) for q ∈ Sti , and
– ∼a⊆ St × St with ∼a :=
(⋃
i∈I ∼Mia
)
∪ ∼ˆa where each ∼ˆa ⊆ ⋃i∈I Sti ×
⋃
i∈I Sti ,
and the following conditions are satisfied:
1. the relation ∼a is transitive for every a ∈ Agt.
2. ∼ˆa is a symmetric relation for every a ∈ Agt.
3. for all i ∈ I we have ∼ˆa ∩ (Sti × Sti ) = ∅ (the relation does only exist between different
ioR-tree like models).
4. for q1 ∈ Sti and q2 ∈ St j with i, j ∈ I , i = j , we have that if q1∼ˆaq2 then
ρMi (q1)≈ˆMa ρM j (q2) or ρMi (q1) = q1 or ρM j (q2) = q2 where for two histories h
and h′ we have h≈ˆMa h′ iff |h| = |h′| and h[l]∼ˆah′[l] for all l = 0, . . . , |h| − 1 (indistin-
guishable nodes in different ioR-tree-like models must have indistinguishable histories
or at least one of the nodes is a root node).
5. for q1, q2 ∈ Sti and ∼Agt= ⋃a∈Agt ∼a , if q1(∼Agt)∗q2 then |ρMi (q1)| = |ρMi (q2)|
(nodes in the same tree indistinguishable for a group must be on the same level). The
idea behind this condition is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Moreover, we define ρM(q1, q2) as ρMi (q1, q2) for q1, q2 ∈ Sti and set ρM(q1, q2) =  if
q1 ∈ Sti and q2 ∈ St j for i = j .
Remark 1 We would like to note that it is possible, due to condition 4 of Definition 16, to
weaken condition 5 of Definition 16 to the following: Let q1 ∈ Sti , q2 ∈ St j , i, j ∈ I , i = j ,
q1(∼Agt)∗q2, and ρM j (q2) = q2 where ∼A=
⋃
a∈A ∼a for A ⊆ Agt. If there is an q ′1 ∈ Sti ,
with q2(∼Agt)∗q ′1; then, |ρMi (q1)| = |ρMi (q ′1)|.
Before we give an intuitive example we show that the concept of isR-pando-like iCGS is
well-defined.
Proposition 6 Let M be an isR-pando like iCGS as defined in Definition 16. Each relation
∼a is an equivalence relation for a ∈ Agt.
Proof By definition, each ∼a is transitive. Symmetry follows from the symmetry of ∼ˆa and
of ∼Mia . Reflexivity of ∼Mia does also imply reflexivity of ∼a . unionsq
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2014) 28:474–518 495
Fig. 7 Condition 5 of
Definition 16
Example 8 Figure 8 depicts an isR-pando-like iCGS. In fact, the model shows a suitable
unfolding of the pointed iCGS (M1, q0) from Fig. 5. We will formally introduce isR-pando
unfoldings in Definition 17.
In the spirit of Propositions 2 and 4 we have that memory is not needed in isR-pando-
like models. The proof for the left-to-right direction is obvious. The sophisticated step is to
construct an isr-strategy from an isR-strategy. For the sake of readability we have moved the
technical part in the appendix (Lemma 3).
Proposition 7 (Recall invariance for is R-pando-like models) For every isR-pando-like iCGS
M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ, we have that M, q |isr ϕ iff M, q |isR ϕ.
Proof Firstly, we recall that all the “subpandos” which form an ioR-tree-like iCGS are not
interconnected by transitions and thus the path to each state is unique. The proof is done
analogously to Proposition 4; we only consider the important base case where ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ
and γ contains no strategic modalities. The left-to-right direction is obvious.
For the right-to-left direction suppose that M, q |isR 〈〈A〉〉γ and let sA be a collective
iR-strategy for A such that for all λ ∈ out is(q, sA) it holds that M, λ |isR γ . Let q ′ ∈ St j be a
state reachable from qˆ ∈ St j with qˆ ∼Ma q for some a ∈ A. Then, we define the memoryless
strategy ta as follows: ta(q ′) = sa(ρM j (qˆ, q ′)). We proceed like this for all states q ′, qˆ and
define the strategies ta arbitrarily but in a uniform way for all other states in M. (Note, that
these are all states which are not reachable from any epistemic alternative of q for some agent
in A.) Firstly, we observe that each ta is well-defined as each M j is ioR-tree-like and thus
the path ρM j (qˆ, q ′) to a state q ′ is unique.
In order to show that each ta is uniform and that out is(q, tA) = out is(q, sA) we have to
prove that for any two states q1 reachable from qˆ1, and q2 reachable from qˆ2 with q1 ∼Ma q2
and qˆ1, qˆ2 ∈ {q ′ ∈ St | q ∼A q ′} (i.e. qˆ1 ∼Mb q ∼Mc qˆ2 for some b, c ∈ A) we also have
ρ(qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρ(qˆ2, q2). This part is shown in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. unionsq
The basic idea of the subjective epistemic pando unfolding under perfect recall (isR-
pando unfolding in short) is to create copies of the tree starting in q ′, one for each epistemic
alternative. Then, we can link hq with these new root nodes q ′ of the “copies” of the trees
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Fig. 8 The figure shows the isR-pando unfolding of (M1, q0) from Fig. 5. All dotted and dashed lines denote
the indistinguishability relation of agent a. Dashed links encode indistinguishability between nodes in trees
that have roots on the same level; dotted links connect nodes in trees from different levels. Again, for the sake
of readability, reflexive and transitive connections are omitted
starting in q ′ (cf. Fig. 8 and take e.g. h = 04, q = 0, and q ′ = 040aˆ1; the new node is
named 040aˆ1 to ensure that the name is unique as explained below). It is easy to see that
these “new” subtrees can only be reached if a formula 〈〈a〉〉γ is evaluated in hq (or some
other state h′′q ′′ with hq ∼Ts (M,q0)a h′′q ′′ by transitivity). As mentioned above all nodes in
these new subtrees must have unique names. This is the reason why we have to prefix each
node h′′ in the new tree by hqaˆ where hq is the history in the “current tree” and aˆ encodes
that we have used a’s indistinguishability relation to reach the “new” tree.
Before we formally define the isR-pando unfolding, we introduce some additional notation.
In the following, we consider words over D := (St ∪ St ◦ {aˆ | a ∈ Agt} ◦ St)+. Thus, D
consists of finite sequences of states, possibly interleaved by references to some agents. We
use elements from D to give names to nodes of the pando unfolding. Essentially, the name of
a node shows how the node is reached from a root by following temporal paths and “jumping”
between different trees by use of epistemic links (cf. Fig. 8).
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We also define auxiliary functions rel : D → St+, ref : D → D, lastr : D → St and
jump : D → Agt ∪ {} as follows:
rel(h) =
{
h, for h ∈ St+;
h′′, for h = h′aˆh′′ and h′′ ∈ St+ and a ∈ Agt;
ref (h) =
{
h if h ∈ St+;
hˆ if h = hˆaˆrel(h);
lastr(h) = last(rel(h));
jump(h) =
{
 if h ∈ St+;
a if h = hˆaˆrel(h).
The intuition for these functions is as follows. Given an element h ∈ D, rel(h) returns the
“relevant” part of h, i.e., the subhistory at the end of h of maximal length that does not contain
any aˆ symbol for any a ∈ Agt. On the other hand, re f (h) returns the “reference” node in
the higher-level tree which was used to obtain h. Finally, jump(h) returns the agent whose
epistemic link was used to “jump” between the two trees. For example, rel(q1aˆq2q3bˆq4) = q4,
ref (q1aˆq2q3bˆq4) = q1aˆq2q3, lastr(ref (q1aˆq2q3bˆq4)) = q3 and jump(q1aˆq2q3bˆq4) = b.
Let M = (Agt, St,, π, {∼a}a∈Agt, Act, d, o) be an iCGS and q ∈ St. We recursively
define sets iM ⊆ D which contain the nodes of the isR-pando unfolding:
0M(q) :=
⋃
q ′∼Ma q
Λ
f in
M (q
′),
i+1M (q) := {haˆh′ | h ∈ iM(q), |rel(h)| ≥ 2, a ∈ Agt, and h′ ∈ Λ f inM (q ′)
for some q ′ ∼Ma lastr(h)}.
We write iM for 
i
M(q) if state q is clear from context. Note that each h ∈ iM contains
exactly i symbols of type aˆ j for a j ∈ Agt and j = 1, . . . , i . Intuitively, aˆ denotes that we took
a ∼a-relation step between different trees. Note also that, for instance, q0q1aˆq2 ∈ 1(q0)
but q0aˆq2 ∈ 1(q0). This is because if a link to a new tree model is taken histories have to
be “forgotten” and in cases in which the history consists of a single state (e.g. q0 in q0aˆq2)
such a link is not necessary and also not desired due to technical reasons. Now, we are ready
to define the isR-pando unfolding.
Definition 17 (is R-pando unfolding) Let M = (Agt, St,, π, {∼a}a∈Agt, Act, d, o) be an
iCGS and q ∈ St. The isR-pando unfolding of (M, q), denoted Ts(M, q), is defined as
Ts := Ts(M, q) = (Agt, St′,, π ′, {∼′a}a∈Agt, Act, d ′, o′) where d ′(a, h), o′(h,α), and
π ′(h) are given as in Definition 12 and 15 where function “last” is replaced with “lastr” and
(note that ∼Tsa refers to relation ∼′a):
1. St′ := ⋃∞i=0 iM(q);
2. for all a ∈ Agt, ∼Tsa ⊆ StM × StM is the smallest reflexive relation such that h ∼Tsa h′ if:
(a) rel(h) ≈Ma rel(h′), for h, h′ ∈ 0M(q), or
(b) rel(h) ≈Ma rel(h′) and
i. ref (h) ∼Tsa ref (h′) and jump(h) = a = jump(h′), and h, h′ ∈ iM(q), i > 0,
or
ii. jump(h) = b = jump(h′) with a = b, and h, h′ ∈ iM(q), i > 0, or
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Fig. 9 Structure of the proofs of Propositions 7 and 8 and of Theorem 3. Full proofs of all results are given
in Appendix 7.2
(c) h ∈ iM, h′ ∈ i+1M , jump(h′) = a, ref (h′) ∼Tsa h, lastr(ref (h′)) ∼Ma rel(h′) or
vice versa with the roles of h and h′ switched.
We note that this means that h′ = hˆaˆq , lastr(hˆ) ∼Ma q , and hˆ ∼Tsa h for some
q ∈ StM and hˆ ∈ iM(q).
Remark 2 (isR-pando unfolding) We motivate points 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) in Definition 17.
Items 2(a) and (b) define indistinguishability between nodes of trees from the same set i . In
this case, the “jump” must be obtained by the same epistemic relation and the final parts of the
corresponding histories in the current trees (the “relevant” parts) must be indistinguishable;
moreover, the “reference” nodes (in the trees one level up) must be indistinguishable for the
“jump” agent (point 2(b)i) in case we are concerned with epistemic alternatives of this very
agent. This is needed to obtain transitivity of the epistemic relation in the resulting forest.
Note that, in particular, the length of the relevant subhistories must be the same.
Item 2(c) defines the only way how nodes h and h′ from different sets i and  j , i = j ,
can be linked via an epistemic link. Firstly, it must be the case that j = i + 1. Secondly, the
relevant part of h′ ∈ i+1 must be a single state which is indistinguishable from the last state
of the reference part of h′ ∈ i ; moreover, the reference part of h′ must also be linked to h.
Note, that the relevant parts of h and h′ do not have to have the same length. This models the
“forgetting” if a new state-subformula is evaluated in h.
Example 9 (is R-pando unfolding) The isR-pando unfolding of model (M1, q0) from Fig. 5
is shown in Fig. 8.
Similarly to Sect. 4.2 we can show that an isR-pando unfolding is isR-pando-like as
expected. For example, it has to be shown that all nodes are disjunct, in order to obtain a
tree-like structure, and that the epistemic relation ∼Ts (M,q)a is an equivalence relation for each
agent a ∈ Agt. The proof of the following result is rather technical and is formally proven
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in the Appendix. The structure of the proof of this proposition and also of our main result,
Theorem 3, is outlined in Fig. 9.
Proposition 8 The isR-pando unfolding of a pointed iCGS is isR-pando-like.
Then, thanks to Proposition 7, we obtain that isR-pando unfoldings are truth-invariant
under recall. Now we can state our main result for isR-pando unfoldings.
Theorem 3 For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ, it holds that
M, q |isR ϕ iff Ts(M, q), q |isR ϕ iff Ts(M, q), q |isr ϕ.
Again, the proof is moved to the Appendix.
5 Comparing validities for variants of ATL
In this section we present a formal comparison of the semantic variants defined in Sects. 2
and 3. As stated in the introduction, we compare the variants on the level of their validity
sets (or, equivalently, satisfiable sentences). In most cases, they turn out to be different. Also,
we can usually show that one variant is a refinement of the other in the sense that its set of
validities strictly subsumes the validities induced by the other variant.
In what follows, we write Val(ATLsem) to denote the set of ATL validities, or the the-
ory of ATL, under semantics sem. Likewise, we write Sat (ATLsem) for the set of ATL
formulae satisfiable in the semantics sem. Note that validity and satisfiability of formu-
lae in all cases considered in this paper is defined over the same class of models, namely
the class of imperfect information concurrent game structures. The conceptual reading of
Val(ATLsem1)  Val(ATLsem2) can be as follows: for “game boards” given by iCGS’s, we
have that the “game rules” in the ATLsem1 variant strictly refine the rules in ATLsem2 . Note
also that Val(ATLsem1)  Val(ATLsem2) is equivalent to Sat (ATLsem2)  Sat (ATLsem1).
Thus, an alternative reading is “ATLsem1 admits reasoning about a larger variety of games
than ATLsem2 ”.
We will always prove inclusion results for the broadest possible language (usually ATL∗)
and non-inclusion results for the narrowest one (usually ATL). Clearly, for languages L ⊆ L′,
we have that Val(L′sem1) ⊆ Val(L′sem2) implies Val(Lsem1) ⊆ Val(Lsem2), and Val(Lsem1) 
Val(Lsem2) implies Val(L′sem1)  Val(L′sem2).
Summary of the results Figure 10 gives an overview of the results of Sects. 5.3–5.6. We show
that almost all the semantic variants discussed here are different on the level of validities, and
that they show a strong pattern: perfect information is a special case of imperfect information,
perfect recall games are special case of memoryless games, and properties of objective and
subjective abilities of agents are incomparable. Moreover, the type of information has more
impact on the validities than the type of recall in the more restricted language of ATL.
Interestingly, for the richer languages of ATL+ and ATL∗ this is not the case anymore.
Note that if we reverse the subsumption signs in Fig. 10 then the graphs describe the
hierarchy of satisfiable sentences in different semantics of ATL/ATL∗.
Remark 3 It is important to observe that comparing validities is not the same as comparing
abilities. For example, subjective ability to enforce γ always implies objective ability to
enforce γ . Yet, as we show in Sect. 5.6, the set of validities for objective ability does not
subsume the one for subjective ability. It is tempting to think that it should, because for
every validity 〈〈A〉〉γ in the subjective semantics, 〈〈A〉〉γ must be also valid in the objective
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(A) (B)
Fig. 10 Comparison of validity sets induced by various semantics of a ATL∗, and b ATL. Arrows depict
strict subsumption of validity sets, e.g., “ATL∗Ir → ATL∗IR” means that Val(ATL∗Ir)  Val(ATL∗IR). Dotted
lines connect semantic variants with incomparable validity sets. We do not include links that follow from
transitivity of the subsumption relation. The hierarchy for ATL+ is exactly the same as for ATL∗
semantics. On the other hand, what about validities stating inability, i.e.,¬〈〈A〉〉γ ? Should they
adhere to the reverse subsumption? Either way, this line of reasoning is totally misleading.
The reason for that is simple. Almost no formulae of type 〈〈A〉〉γ or ¬〈〈A〉〉γ are validities
of ATL in any semantics that we study. There are only two exceptions: 〈〈A〉〉	 and ¬〈〈A〉〉⊥.
Or, to be more precise, all formulae 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ is tautologically true (i.e., holds on all
paths that can occur in any CGS) and ¬〈〈A〉〉γ where γ is tautologically false (i.e., fails on all
paths in all CGS’s). For a nontrivial ability (that is, one which refers to a temporal property
that can, but does not have to be true), a valid formula can only connect it to another kind of
ability. For example, 〈〈A〉〉♦p → 〈〈A ∪ B〉〉♦p is valid in all the semantics considered in this
paper.
5.1 Perfect recall versus memoryless play under perfect information (IR vs. Ir)
We first proceed to examine the impact of recall on the general strategic properties of agent
systems under prefect information. The inclusion results follow naturally from the invariance
theorems for tree-like unfoldings presented in Sect. 4. Non-inclusion will be demonstrated
by appropriate formulae (that are valid in one semantics and not valid in another). We have
already mentioned that, in ATL, the Ir- and IR-semantics coincide (Proposition 1). As a
consequence, they induce the same validities: Val(ATLIr) = Val(ATLIR). Thus, regardless
of the type of their recall, perfect information agents possess the same abilities with respect
to winning conditions that can be specified in ATL. An interesting question is: Does it carry
over to more general classes of winning conditions, or are there (broader) languages that
can discern between the two types of ability? The answer is: no, it doesn’t, and yes, there are.
The Ir- and IR-semantics induce different validity sets for ATL∗, and in fact the distinction
is already present in ATL+. Moreover, it turns out that perfect recall can be seen as a special
case of memoryless play in the sense of their general properties.
Proposition 9 Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗IR)
Proof Let an ATL∗-formula ϕ be Ir-valid in iCGS’s, then it is also Ir-valid in tree-like
CGS’s, and by Proposition 2 also IR-valid in tree-like CGS’s. Thus, by Theorem 1, it is IR-
valid in arbitrary CGS’s. Since indistinguishability relations do not influence the semantic
relation |IR, we get that ϕ is IR-valid in iCGS’s. unionsq
In particular, the subsumption holds for formulae of ATL+. Moreover:
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Fig. 11 Single-agent model M5:
robot with multiple tasks
Proposition 10 Val(ATL+IR) ⊆ Val(ATL+Ir).
Proof Consider formula
3 ≡ 〈〈a〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2) ↔ 〈〈a〉〉♦(p1 ∧ 〈〈a〉〉♦p2 ∨ p2 ∧ 〈〈a〉〉♦p1).
The formula is valid in ATL+IR [33]. On the other hand, its right-to-left part is not valid in
ATL+Ir . To see this, we take the single-agent CGS M5 from Fig. 11 where agent a (the robot)
can do the cleaning or deliver a package. Then, for p1 ≡ clean, p2 ≡ delivered, we have
M5, q0 |Ir 〈〈a〉〉♦(p1 ∧ 〈〈a〉〉♦p2 ∨ p2 ∧ 〈〈a〉〉♦p1) but also M5, q0 |Ir 〈〈a〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2). unionsq
Theorem 4 Val(ATLIr) = Val(ATLIR). However, Val(ATL+Ir)  Val(ATL+IR) and
Val(ATL∗Ir)  Val(ATL∗IR).
Proof From Proposition 1 it follows that Val(ATLIr) = Val(ATLIR). From Proposition 9 we
know that Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗IR) and can also deduce that Val(ATL+Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL+IR)
because the language of ATL+ is just a syntactic restriction of the one of ATL∗. Finally,
Proposition 10 proves that Val(ATL+Ir)  Val(ATL
+
IR) and also that Val(ATL
∗
Ir) 
Val(ATL∗IR) because the formula given in the proof of the very proposition is in particu-
lar also an ATL∗-formula. unionsq
5.2 Perfect recall versus memoryless play under imperfect information (iR vs. ir)
Now we compare the memoryless and perfect recall semantics under uncertainty. We treat
the case of objective and subjective ability separately.
5.2.1 Imperfect information: objective ability
Proposition 11 Val(ATL∗ior) ⊆ Val(ATL∗ioR).
Proof We prove that Sat (ATL∗ioR) ⊆ Sat (ATL∗ior). Let ϕ ∈ Sat (ATL∗ioR). Then, there
must be a pointed iCGS (M, q) such that M, q |ioR ϕ. By Theorem 2, To(M, q), q |ioR
ϕ. But on ioR-tree unfoldings, iR- and ir-strategies coincide (Theorem 2), so we get that
To(M, q), q |ior ϕ, and as a consequence ϕ ∈ Sat (ATL∗ior). unionsq
The converse does not hold:
Proposition 12 Val(ATLioR) ⊆ Val(ATLior)
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Fig. 12 Model M6 with
Agt = {a}: dangers of marital life
Proof To show this, we take the ATL embedding of the CTL duality between combinators
E and A♦ (see Sect. 2.5). In fact, only one direction of the equivalence is important here:
4 ≡ ¬〈〈∅〉〉♦¬p → 〈〈Agt〉〉p
(note that the other direction is valid for all the semantics considered in this paper, and actually
for all the reasonable semantics of strategic ability that one can come up with).
First, we observe that: (i) ¬〈〈∅〉〉♦¬p expresses (regardless of the actual type of ability
being considered) that there is a path in the system on which p always holds; (ii) in the
“objective” semantics the set out (q, sAgt) always consists of exactly one path; (iii) for every
path λ starting from q , there is an ioR-strategy sAgt such that out (q, sAgt) = {λ}. From these,
it is easy to see that 4 is valid in ATLioR.
Second, we consider model M6 in Fig. 12.10 Let us take p ≡ ¬angry ∧ ¬suspicious.
Then, we have M6, q0 |ior ¬〈〈∅〉〉♦¬p but also M6, q0 |ior 〈〈Agt〉〉p, which demonstrates
that 4 is not valid in ATLior. unionsq
Theorem 5 Val(ATLior)  Val(ATLioR), and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
5.2.2 Imperfect information: subjective ability
Proposition 13 Val(ATL∗isr) ⊆ Val(ATL∗isR).
Proof Analogous to Proposition 11. unionsq
Proposition 14 Val(ATLisR) ⊆ Val(ATLisr).
Proof We take the formula 5 which is a consequence of the fixpoint equivalence for 〈〈a〉〉♦p:
5 ≡ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p → 〈〈a〉〉♦p.
The formula states that if a has an opening move and a follow-up strategy to achieve p
eventually, then these can be integrated into a single strategy achieving p already from the
10 The example depicts some simple traps that await a married man if he happens to be absent-minded.
If he doesn’t kiss his wife in the morning, he is likely to make her angry. However, if he kisses her more
than once, she might get suspicious. It is easy to see that the absent-minded (i.e., memoryless) husband does
not have a strategy to survive safely through the morning, though a safe path through the model does exist
(λ = q0q1q1q1 . . .).
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initial state. It is easy to see that 5 is valid in ATLisR, and that the single strategy is just
a concatenation of the two strategies that we get on the left hand side of the implication.
On the other hand, for the “poor duck model” M1 and p ≡ shot, we get that M1, q0 |isr〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p but also M1, q0 |isr 〈〈a〉〉♦p, so 5 is not valid in ATLisr. unionsq
Theorem 6 Val(ATLisr)  Val(ATLisR), and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
5.3 Perfect versus imperfect information under memoryless play (Ir vs. ir)
We continue by comparing perfect and imperfect information scenarios. That is, in the first
class (I), agents recognize the current global state of the system by definition. In the latter
(is/io), uncertainty of agents about states constrains their choices. Firstly, we observe that
perfect information can be seen as a special case of imperfect information.
Proposition 15 Val(ATL∗isr) ⊆ Val(ATL∗Ir) and Val(ATL∗ior) ⊆ Val(ATL∗Ir).
Proof Since perfect information of agents can be explicitly represented in iCGS by fixing
all relations ∼a as the minimal reflexive relations (q ∼a q ′ iff q = q ′), we have that ϕ ∈
Sat (ATL∗Ir) implies ϕ ∈ Sat (ATL∗isr) and ϕ ∈ Sat (ATL∗ior). Thus, dually, Val(ATL∗isr) ⊆
Val(ATL∗Ir) and Val(ATL∗ior) ⊆ Val(ATL∗Ir). unionsq
Proposition 16 Val(ATLIr) ⊆ Val(ATLisr).
Proof We show this by presenting a validity for ATLIr which is not valid in ATLisr. Consider
the formula that captures the right-to-left direction in the fixpoint characterization of 〈〈A〉〉♦ϕ
for single-agent teams and atomic propositions:
1 ≡ (p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p) → 〈〈a〉〉♦p
1 is Ir-valid (cf. Sect. 2.5). To see its invalidity in the isr-semantics, consider model M1
from Fig. 5. We recall that the story behind the model is as follows. A man wants to shoot
down a yellow rubber duck in a shooting gallery. The man knows that the duck is in one of
the two cells in front of him, but he does not know in which one. Moreover, this has been a
long party, and he is very tired, so he is only capable of using memoryless strategies at the
moment. Does he have a memoryless strategy which he knows will achieve the goal? No. He
can either decide to shoot to the left, or to the right, or reach out to the cells and look what
is in (note also that the cells close in the moment after being opened). In each of these cases
the man risks that he will fail (at least from his subjective point of view). Can he identify an
opening strategy that will guarantee his knowing how to shoot the duck in the next moment?
Yes. The opening strategy is to look; if the system proceeds to q4 then the second strategy is
to shoot to the left, otherwise the second strategy is to shoot to the right.
Indeed, for p ≡ shot, we get M1, q0 |isr p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p and M1, q0 |isr 〈〈a〉〉♦p,
which formally concludes our proof. unionsq
Proposition 17 Val(ATLIr) ⊆ Val(ATLior).
Proof It is sufficient to show that 1 ≡ (p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p) → 〈〈a〉〉♦p is invalid in the
ior-semantics. Take model M2 in Fig. 13 and p ≡ shot. Now we have that M2, q ′0 |ior
p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p because a has a uniform strategy that objectively achieves ♦p in q0
(sa(q) = shootL for every q) and another uniform strategy in q1 (s′a(q) = shootR for
every q). However, sa and s′a cannot be merged into a single uniform strategy, and indeed
M2, q ′0 |ior 〈〈a〉〉♦p, which concludes the proof. unionsq
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Fig. 13 Modified “poor duck” model M2 with two agents a, b. This time, we explicitly represent the agent
(b) who puts the duck in one of the cells
Note that, for ATLior, formula 1 is valid in single-agent models, so we really needed to
add another agent to the picture.
The following theorems are straightforward consequences.
Theorem 7 Val(ATLisr)  Val(ATLIr), Val(ATL
+
isr)  Val(ATL
+
Ir), and Val(ATL∗isr) 
Val(ATL∗Ir).
Theorem 8 Val(ATLior)  Val(ATLIr), and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
By Proposition 1 and Theorems 4, 7, and 8, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Val(ATLisr)  Val(ATLIR) and Val(ATLior)  Val(ATLIR), and similarly for
ATL+ and ATL∗.
5.4 Perfect versus imperfect information under perfect recall play (IR vs. iR)
First, we observe that for ATLioR versus ATLIR we can employ the same reasoning as for
ATLior versus ATLIr . Abilities under perfect information can be still seen as a special case
of imperfect information abilities, and we can use the same model M2 to invalidate the same
formula 1 in ATLioR. Thus, analogously to Theorem 8 we get:
Theorem 9 Val(ATLioR)  Val(ATLIR), and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
By the same reasoning as above, Val(ATLisR) ⊆ Val(ATLIR). To settle the other direction,
we need to use another counterexample, though.
Proposition 18 Val(ATLIR) ⊆ Val(ATLisR).
Proof This time we consider the other direction of the fixpoint characterization for 〈〈a〉〉♦p:
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Fig. 14 Variant of “poor duck”
after a particularly long party
(model M3)
2 ≡ 〈〈a〉〉♦p → (p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p).
2 is IR-valid, but it is not valid in isR. Consider a modification of the “poor duck model”
in Fig. 14 (the party goes on, and the man is not even able to reach out and look anymore;
the cells are open initially but they will close in a moment). Take p ≡ shot. We have that
M3, q4 |isR 〈〈a〉〉♦p, but M3, q4 |isR p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p, which concludes the proof. unionsq
Theorem 10 Val(ATLisR)  Val(ATLIR), and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
5.5 Mixed setting: information versus memory (Ir vs. iR)
In this section we compare abilities if both dimensions change. For ATL we already know
the complete picture because ATLIr and ATLIR are the same logics, cf. Fig. 10b. For ATL∗
it remains to compare ATL∗Ir , ATL∗ioR, and ATL
∗
isr.
To facilitate proofs, we define an additional temporal operator N (“now”) as Nϕ ≡ ϕ U ϕ.
Note that M, λ | Nϕ iff M, λ | ϕ in the semantics of CTL∗ and any ATL-semantics that
we have discussed in this paper. Moreover, we note that the formula 〈〈A〉〉Nϕ expresses E Aϕ
(everybody in A knows that ϕ) if 〈〈A〉〉 is interpreted according to the subjective semantics
for imperfect information (i.e., according to |isR and |isr ).
Theorem 11 The sets Val(ATL∗isR) and Val(ATL
∗
Ir) are incomparable, and similarly for
ATL+.
Proof We prove incomparability for ATL+. From this, incomparability for ATL∗ follows
immediately.
1. Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗isR). Suppose that Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗isR). This implies that
Val(ATLIr) ⊆ Val(ATLisR) and by Theorem 4 Val(ATLIR) ⊆ Val(ATLisR). But this
contradicts Theorem 10.
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2. Val(ATL∗isR) ⊆ Val(ATL∗Ir). For this case we consider the ATL∗ -formula
6 = 〈〈Agt〉〉♦〈〈Agt〉〉N(p1 ∧ 〈〈Agt〉〉♦p2) → 〈〈Agt〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2)
which is a validity of ATL+isR but not of ATL
+
Ir . The latter fact can be shown by the same
counterexample as used in the proof of Proposition 10 (we have M5, q0 |Ir 6).
It remains to show that 6 ∈Val(ATL+isR). Suppose that M, q |isR 〈〈Agt〉〉♦〈〈Agt〉〉N(p1∧
〈〈Agt〉〉♦p2). That is, there is an iR-strategy sAgt such that for all λ ∈ outis(q, sAgt) there
is an i ≥ 0 and an iR-strategy s′
Agt such that for all λ
′ ∈ outis(λ[i], s′
Agt) we have that
λ′[0] | p1 and there is an iR-strategy s′′Agt such that for all λ′′ ∈ outis(λ′[0], s′′Agt) it
holds that M, λ′′ | ♦p2.
Because we have that {q ′ | q ′ ∼Agt λ[i]} = {q ′ | q ′ ∼Agt λ′[0]}, we can take s′Agt as
s′′
Agt. Then, we have that M, q |isR 〈〈Agt〉〉♦〈〈Agt〉〉N(p1 ∧ 〈〈Agt〉〉♦p2) iff there is an
iR-strategy sAgt such that for all λ ∈ outis(q, sAgt) there is an i ≥ 0 and an iR-strategy
s′
Agt such that for all λ
′ ∈ outis(λ[i], s′
Agt) we have that λ
′[0] | p1 and M, λ′ | ♦p2.
Now, it is easy to see that we can combine sAgt and each s′Agt to a single strategy sˆAgt
such that for all λ ∈ outis(q, sˆAgt) it holds that M, λ | ♦p1 ∧ ♦p2. This shows that
M, q | 〈〈Agt〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2). unionsq
Apart from minor modifications, the next theorem, considering objective ability, is proven
along the same lines.
Theorem 12 The sets Val(ATL∗ioR) and Val(ATL
∗
Ir) are incomparable, and similarly for
ATL+.
Proof Again, we prove incomparability for ATL+. From this, incomparability for ATL∗
follows immediately.
1. Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗ioR). Suppose that Val(ATL∗Ir) ⊆ Val(ATL∗ioR). This implies
that Val(ATLIr) ⊆ Val(ATLioR) and by Theorem 4 Val(ATLIR) ⊆ Val(ATLioR). But
this contradicts Theorem 9.
2. Val(ATL∗ioR) ⊆ Val(ATL∗Ir). For this case we consider the ATL∗-formula
ϕ = 〈〈Agt〉〉♦(p1 ∧ 〈〈Agt〉〉♦p2) → 〈〈Agt〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2)
which is a validity of ATL∗ioR but not of ATL
∗
Ir . The latter is shown by the same coun-
terexample as used in the proof of Proposition 10 (we have M5, q0 |Ir ϕ).
Finally, it remains to show that ϕ ∈ Val(ATL∗ioR). This part is proven following the
same idea as in the proof of Theorem 11. We observe that every strategy sAgt of the
grand coalition generates a unique path wrt. objective ability (because, in the objective
semantics, possible paths starting from epistemic alternatives are not considered). This
also means that uniformity of a strategy does not matter: there is no need to ever consider
epistemic alternatives along a path. Hence, the two strategies witnessing 〈〈Agt〉〉♦(p1 ∧
〈〈Agt〉〉♦p2) can be combined to a single strategy witnessing 〈〈Agt〉〉(♦p1 ∧ ♦p2). unionsq
5.6 Between subjective and objective ability for imperfect information (is vs. io)
Finally, we compare validity sets for the semantic variants of ATL that differ on the outcome
paths which are taken into account, i.e., whether only the paths representing the “objectively”
possible courses of action are considered, or all the executions that are “subjectively” possible
from the agents’ perspective.
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Proposition 19 Formula 2 ≡ 〈〈a〉〉♦p → p∨〈〈a〉〉 〈〈a〉〉♦p is valid in ATLioR and ATLior,
but invalid in ATLisR and ATLisr.
Proof We first prove validity of 2 in ATLior, which implies also validity in ATLioR by
Proposition 11. Suppose that M, q |ior 〈〈a〉〉♦p, then there must be an ir-strategy sA that
enforces ♦p for every execution starting from q . But then, if p is not the case right at the
beginning, sA must lead to a next state from which it enforces ♦p.
For the second part, invalidity of 2 in ATLisR was already proved in Proposition 18.
Thus, by Proposition 13, 2 is not valid in ATLisr, too. unionsq
In the next result we make use of the operator N introduced in Sect. 5.5.
Proposition 20 Formula
8 ≡ 〈〈a〉〉N〈〈c〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 p → 〈〈a, c〉〉♦p
is valid in ATLisR and ATLisr, but invalid in ATLioR and ATLior.
Proof Analogously to Proposition 19, we prove the validity of 8 in ATLisr, and its invalidity
in ATLioR.
First, let M, q |isr 〈〈a〉〉N〈〈c〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 p. Then, for every state q ′ ∈ [q]∼a , c has an ir-
strategy sq
′
c that enforces 〈〈a〉〉 p from [q ′]∼c . By combining all these strategies into an
ir-strategy sc (we can do it since the strategies sq
′
c are successful for whole indistinguishability
classes of c), we have that sc enforces 〈〈a〉〉 p from every state in [q]∼{a,c} , regardless
of what the other players do (in particular, regardless of what a does). But then, for every
execution λ of sc from [q]∼{a,c} , a will have a choice to enforce p from [λ[1]]∼a . Again,
collecting these choices together yields an ir-strategy sa (we can fix the remaining choices
arbitrarily). By taking s{a,c} = (sa, sc), we get a strategy for {a, c} that enforces that p will
be true in two steps, from every state in [q]∼{a,c} . Hence, also M, q |isr 〈〈a, c〉〉♦p.
For the invalidity, consider the modified poor duck model M2 from Fig. 13 augmented
with additional agent c that has no choice (i.e., at each state, it has only a single irrelevant
action wait available). Let us denote the new iCGS by M ′3, and let p ≡ shot. It is easy to
see that M ′2, q ′0 |ioR 〈〈c〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 p, and hence also M ′2, q ′0 |ioR 〈〈a〉〉N〈〈c〉〉 〈〈a〉〉 p. On
the other hand, M ′2, q ′0 |ioR 〈〈a, c〉〉♦p, which concludes the proof. unionsq
The following is an immediate consequence.
Theorem 13 For every y, z ∈ {R, r}, the sets Val(ATLisy) and Val(ATLioz) are incompara-
ble, and similarly for ATL+ and ATL∗.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we compare validity sets for different semantic variants of alternating-time
temporal logic. In other words, we compare the general properties of games induced by
different notions of ability. It is clear that changing the notions of strategy and success in
a game leads to a different game. The issue considered here is whether, given a class of
games, such a change leads to a different class of games, too. And, if so, what is the precise
relationship between the two classes.
A summary of the results is presented in Fig. 10. The first and most important conclusion
is that almost all the semantic variants discussed here are indeed different on the level of
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general properties they induce; before our study, it was by no means obvious. Moreover,
our results show a very strong pattern: perfect information is a special case of imperfect
information, perfect recall games are special case of memoryless games, and properties of
objective and subjective abilities of agents are incomparable.
The relationships seem very natural, but they were surprisingly nontrivial to prove. This is
best witnessed by Sect. 4 which comprises a third part of the paper only to construct appropri-
ate tree-like unfoldings, and prove their equivalence to the original models. While embedding
of perfect information in imperfect information is straightforward, the same cannot be said
about embedding perfect recall in memoryless semantics—except when we disallow nested
modalities. Consider e.g. the truth of formula 〈〈a〉〉〈〈a, b〉〉♦p in a pointed iCGS (M, q). Let
sa be a’s strategy that enforces 〈〈a, b〉〉♦p to be always the case (suppose that such a strategy
exists). After a history h, agent a has different information when executing sa (because the
agent has collected observations along h from the root until now) than when we evaluate
〈〈a, b〉〉♦p in the last state of h (here, the collecting of observations starts anew). In conse-
quence, the “straightforward” unfolding of (M, q) endows agents with too much information
when nested strategic formulas are evaluated, and the correctness of the construction is not
automatic. For objective abilities, we prove that the standard unfolding still works because
path formulae of ATL∗ (that can be seen as “winning conditions” in the corresponding game)
do not discern between the two epistemic positions. For subjective abilities, the unfolding
does not work, but it can be recovered by a technical construction with “hanging” subtrees
added to the basic tree. This construction is among the main contributions of this paper.
Technical subtleties aside, the most interesting contribution lies possibly in our non-
inclusion results. First, they show that the language of ATL is sufficiently expressive to
distinguish between the main notions of ability. Moreover, non-inclusion is demonstrated
on formulae encoding intuitive and well known properties, like fixpoint characterizations of
strategic/temporal modalities and the duality between necessary and obtainable outcomes.
It is important to see in which semantics the formulae hold, and in which they do not hold.
Finally, although the proofs of non-inclusion are very comprehensive (since they are based
on counterexamples), finding the counterexamples required expertise and was not straight-
forward either.
Another interesting outcome of the study is that the type of information has strictly more
impact on validities than the type of recall in the language of ATL but not in ATL∗. In
particular the validity sets of ATL∗Ir and ATL∗iR are incomparable. This suggests that ATL∗
allows to specify significantly subtler properties of strategic play than the more restricted
language of ATL.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
7.1 Proofs of Sect. 4.2
The following Lemma is obvious by the definition of ioR-tree unfoldings. It states that that
nodes group indistinguishable in the tree unfolding are also group indistinguishable in the
model if interpreted as histories.
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Lemma 1 Let M be an iCGS, h1 and h2 two nodes in its ioR-tree unfolding, and A ⊆ Agt
a group of agents. If h1 ∼To(M,q)A h2 then h1 ≈MA h2.
Moreover, we have that all histories indistinguishable in the model are also indistinguish-
able in the tree if only states reachable from the current state are considered.
Lemma 2 Let M be an iCGS, A ⊆ Agt and h a node in To(M, q). Then, for all h1, h2 ∈
ΛM(last (h)) we have that
i f h1 ≈MA h2 then h(h1[1,∞]) ∼To(M,q)A h(h2[1,∞]).
Theorem 2 For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ we have:
M, q |ioR ϕ iff To(M, q), q |ioR ϕ iff To(M, q), q |ior ϕ.
Proof We show that, for every node h in To(M, q), it holds that M, last (h) |ioR ϕ iff
To(M, q), h |ior ϕ. Then, the claim follows by Propositions 4 and 5 and for h = q . The
proof is done by induction on the structure of ϕ.
Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ contains no nested strategic modalities.
“⇒”: Suppose that M, last (h) |ioR 〈〈A〉〉γ . So, there is an ioR-strategy sA such that
() ∀λ ∈ outM(last (h), sA) : M, λ |ioR γ.
We construct the memoryless strategy s′A in To(M, q) as follows: s′a(hˆh′) = sa(last (h)h′)
for every a ∈ A and hˆ such that h ∼To(M,q)A hˆ. For all other histories h′′ (which do not
have the form hˆh′) we define s′a(h′′) arbitrarily but in a uniform way. It is easy to see
that s′A is uniform: For two histories h1 = hˆ′h′ and h2 = hˆ′′h′′ with hˆ′ ∼To(M,q)A h and
hˆ′′ ∼To(M,q)A h and h1 ∼To(M,q)A h2 we have s′A(h1) = s′A(h2); for, h1 ∼To(M,q)A h2
implies h1 ≈MA h2 (by Lemma 1) and thus sA(last (h)h′) = sA(last (h)h′′).
By construction of s′A we have that
last (h)q1q2 · · · ∈ outM(last (h), sA) iff (h)(hq1)(hq1q2) · · · ∈ outTo(M,q)(h, s′A).
Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and
by () we have To(M, q), h |ior 〈〈A〉〉γ .
⇐: Suppose we have To(M, q), h |ior 〈〈A〉〉γ . So there is an ior-strategy sA such that
() ∀λ ∈ outTo(M,q)(h, sA) : To(M, q), λ |ior γ.
We construct a witnessing ioR-strategy s′A in M as follows: s′a(hˆ) = sa(hh′) for every
a ∈ A and hˆ such that last (h)h′ ≈Ma hˆ and last (h)h′ ∈ Λ f inM (last (h)). We define s′a
arbitrarily for all other histories with the condition to assign the same actions to indis-
tinguishable histories in M. The definition of s′a does only take into account the subtree
starting at h. Then, by Lemma 2 we have that strategy s′A is uniform by construction.
Note, that it may differ from sA but only for histories which are not realizable given that
the initial state is last(h).
By construction of s′A, we also have
(h)(hq1)(hq1q2) · · · ∈ outTo(M,q)(h, sA) iff last (h)q1q2 · · · ∈ outM(last (h), s′A).
Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and
by () we have M, last (h) |ioR 〈〈A〉〉γ .
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Fig. 15 General setting of the
proof of Proposition 7
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . M, last (h) |ioR ¬ψ iff not M, last (h) |ioR ψ iff (by induction
hypothesis) not To(M, q), h |ioR ψ iff To(M, q), h |ioR ¬ψ .
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ . By induction hypothesis we have for each history h in To(M, q) and
each strict state-subformula ϕ′ of γ that M, last(h) |ioR ϕ′ iff To(M, q), h |ior ϕ′.
For any maximal strict subformula ϕ′ of ϕ we label all states h in To(M, q) and states
last (h) in M with a new proposition pϕ′ iff ϕ′ holds in this very state. Then, we replace
each ϕ′ in ϕ with proposition pϕ′ . This yields a formula without nested modalities and
the claim follows by induction. unionsq
7.2 Proofs of Sect. 4.3
In this section we give all details needed to prove Theorem 3. The structure of the proof is
shown in Fig. 9.
The following lemma is essential to show that truth in isR-pando-like models is insensitive
to the type of available strategies (memoryless vs. perfect recall). The lemma is needed to
show that a uniform perfect recall strategy in the pando-like model gives rise to a uniform
memoryless strategy. Therefore, we have to show that two states which are indistinguishable
in the model give rise to indistinguishable histories.
Lemma 3 Let M be an isR-pando like iCGS and q, q1, qˆ1, q2, qˆ2 ∈ St where qi is reachable
from qˆi , i.e. ρ(qˆi , qi ) = , for i = 1, 2. Moreover, let qˆ1 ∼Mb q ∼Mc qˆ2 for some b, c ∈ A
and q1 ∼Ma q2. Then, we have that ρ(qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρ(qˆ2, q2).
Proof The setting is illustrated in Fig. 15. In the following we consider all possibilities how
q , qˆ1, qˆ2, q1, and q2 can be located. We recall that ρMk (q ′) = q ′ means that q ′ is the root
node of model Mk . We assume that k, l, m ∈ I where I is the index set from Definition 16.
Case 1: q1∼ˆaq2. Let q1 ∈ Mk and q2 ∈ Ml , k = l.
Case 1.1: ρMk (q1) = q1. That is, q1 is the root node of Mk . We have qˆ1 = q1 ∼Mb q .
Then, by Definition 16.5 |ρ(qˆ2)| = |ρ(q2)| which implies qˆ2 = q2. Hence, we have
ρMk (qˆ1, q1) = q1 ≈Ma ρMl (qˆ2, q2) = q2 and are done.
Case 1.2 ρMk (q2) = q2. Analogously to Case 1.1.
Case 1.3 ρMk (q1)≈ˆMa ρMl (q2) and both q1 and q2 are not root nodes.
Case 1.3.1 qˆ1∼ˆMb q . Let q ∈ Stm with m = k.
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Case 1.3.1.1 ρMk (qˆ1) = qˆ1. Then, qˆ1∼ˆMa q ′ where q ′ ∈ Stl is the root node
of Ml . But then, by Definition 16.5 we have |ρ(q ′)| = |ρ(qˆ2)| and thus
ρMl (qˆ2) = qˆ2. This proves that ρMk (qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρMl (qˆ2, q2).
Case 1.3.1.2 ρMm (q) = q . Again, by Definition 16.5 following the same
reasoning as in Case 1.3.1.1 we obtain ρMl (qˆ2) = qˆ2. Showing that
ρMk (qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρMl (qˆ2, q2).
Case 1.3.1.3 ρMk (qˆ1)≈ˆMa ρMm (q) and neither qˆ1 nor q are root nodes.
Then, we either have that l = m and ρMl (qˆ2)≈Ma ρMl (q) which implies
that ρMk (qˆ1, q1)≈ˆMa ρMl (qˆ2, q2). Or, l = m and we have to distinguish
again two cases. If qˆ2 is the root node; then, it is connected with the root
q ′ ∈ Stk of Mk by ∼Ma . We have q ′ ∼Ma qˆ2 ∼Mc q ∼Mb qˆ1 and by
Definition 16.5 it must be the case that |ρ(q ′)| = |ρ(qˆ1)|. Contradiction.
Hence, we can safely assume that qˆ2 is not a root. Then, ρMl (qˆ2)≈Mc
ρMm (q) ≈Mb ρMk (qˆ1). So, all these states are on the same height level
which implies that ρMk (qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρMl (qˆ2, q2).
Case 1.3.2 qˆ2∼ˆMa q . Analogously to Case 1.3.1.
Case 1.3.3 qˆ1 ∼Mka q or qˆ2 ∼Mla q . In each of these cases it means that either
q ∈ Stk or q ∈ Stl as k = l. Case 1.3.1 or Case 1.3.2 applies.
Case 2: q1 ∼Mka q2. Then, by definition k = l and ρMk (q1) ≈Ma ρMk (q2).
Case 2.1: q ∈ Stk . We have |ρMk (qˆ1)| = |ρMk (q)| = |ρMk (qˆ2)| which follows from
the assumption qˆ1 ∼Mkb q ∼Mkc qˆ2; hence also, ρMk (qˆ1, q1)≈ˆMa ρMk (qˆ2, q2).
Case 2.2: q ∈ Stm, m = k. Then, we have qˆ1∼ˆMb q∼ˆMc qˆ2. Again we have to
distinguish the different cases how q is connected to qˆ1 and qˆ2 respectively.
Case 2.1.1 ρMm (q) = q . That is, we assume that q is a root node. By Defini-
tion 16.5 we have |ρ(qˆ1)| = |ρ(qˆ2)| and ρ(qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma ρ(qˆ2, q2) follows.
Case 2.1.2 ρMm (q) =q . We have ρMk (qˆ1)≈ˆMb ρMl (q) and ρMk (qˆ2)≈ˆMc ρMl (q)
which implies |ρMk (qˆ1)|=|ρMm (q)|=|ρMk (qˆ2)| and hence ρMk (qˆ1, q1) ≈Ma
ρMk (qˆ2, q2). unionsq
The next lemma analyses the structure of two indistinguishable nodes from subsequent
tree levels.
Lemma 4 Let M be an iCGS, q a state in it, h1 ∈ iM(q), h2 ∈ i+1M (q), and h1 ∼Ts (M,q)a
h2 for some i ∈ N0. Then, we have that lastr(h1) ∼Ma rel(h2).
Proof By definition, we have that ref (h2) ∼Ts (M,q)a h1 and lastr(ref (h2)) ∼Ma rel(h2).
Because ref (h2) ∈ iM(q) we also have rel(h1) ≈Ma rel(ref (h2)), and hence lastr(h1) ∼Ma
lastr(ref (h2)). The claim follows because lastr(ref (h2)) ∼Ma rel(h2) and by the transitivity
of ∼Ma . unionsq
The next lemma states that nodes which are indistinguishable for a group of agents must
be located on subsequent or the same level of the pando unfolding; moreover, it characterizes
the structure of these nodes.
Lemma 5 Let M be an iCGS, q a state in it, and A ⊆ Agt be a group of agents. Then, for
all h ∈ StTs (M,q) there is an i ∈ N0 such that for all h′ ∈ StTs (M,q) with h(∼Ts (M,q)A )∗h′ we
have that h, h′ ∈ iM(q) ∪ i+1M (q); moreover, if h′ ∈ i+1M (q) h(∼Ts (M,q)A )∗h′ and there
is an h′′ ∈ iM(q) with h(∼Ts (M,q)A )∗h′′ then rel(h′) ∈ StM and jump(h′) ∈ A.
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Proof We write Ts for Ts(M, q) and i for iM(q) and so on. We proceed by induction on
the length of the epistemic path h′ = h1 ∼a1 · · · ∼al+1 hl+1. We show the following: (i) if
h j ∈ i for all j = 1, . . . , l then hl+1 ∈ i−1 ∪ i ∪ i+1; if this is not the case then (ii)
if h j ∈ i ∪ i+1 for all j = 1, . . . , l then hl+1 ∈ i ∪ i+1 and for each h j ∈ i+1 we
have that rel(h j ) ∈ St, jump(h j ) ∈ A, and ref (h j ) ∈ i .
Base case The case for h ∼a h′ is clear by definition.
Induction step Suppose we have h′ = h1 ∼a1 · · · ∼al hl satisfying the assumption and
assume that hl ∼al+1 hl+1. Firstly, assume that case (i) applies; that is, that all h j ∈ i for
j = 1, . . . , l. By definition hl+1 ∈ i−1 ∪ i ∪ i+1. Moreover, if hl+1 ∈ i+1 then it
must have the required form h′′aˆq ′ by Definition 17(c).
We consider case (ii). Firstly, suppose that hl ∈ i+1 and hl = h′aˆlq ′. We consider
hl ∼al+1 hl+1. By definition hl+1 ∈ i ∪i+1∪i+2. If hl+1 ∈ i+1 it also has the required
form. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that hl+1 ∈ i+2. Then, hl+1 = h′′aˆl+1q ′′ for
some h′′ ∈ i+1 with h′′ ∼al+1 hl . In this case, h′′ does also have the form h′′ = h′′′aˆlq ′′′
and therewith hl+1 = h′′′aˆlq ′′′aˆl+1q ′′ contradicting hl+1 ∈ i+2 by definition of the sets
 j .
Secondly, if hl ∈ i we have that hl+1 ∈ i−1i ∪ i+1 and that hl+1 has the required
form if hl+1 ∈ i+1 following the very same reasoning as in case (i). Moreover, it cannot be
the case that hl+1 ∈ i−1. To see this, we observe that there is some hu with 1 ≤ u < l + 1,
hu ∈ i+1 and hl+1(∼TsA )∗hu . Now the reasoning of the previous case can be applied to
obtain a contradiction. unionsq
The next lemma states that the relevant parts (i.e. histories) of two states of the pando
unfolding are group indistinguishable in the model if the states are group indistinguishable
in the pando unfolding and are located within the same tree (i.e. share the same root node).
Lemma 6 Let h1(∼TsA )∗h2. If there is an i ∈ N0 with h1, h2 ∈ i then rel(h1)(≈MA )∗rel(h2).
Proof The poof is done by induction on the number of epistemic steps between h1 and h2.
More precisely, we show that for all h′ with h1(∼TsA )∗h′ we have that
(i) rel(h1)(≈MA )∗rel(h′) if h′ ∈ i ;
(ii) ref (h′)(∼TsA )∗h1 and lastr(h1)(∼MA )∗lastr(ref (h′)) if h′ ∈ i+1;
(iii) and rel(h1)(∼MA )∗lastr(h′) if h′ ∈ i−1 (and i > 0).
The base cases are clear by definition. We assume that h1(∼TsA )∗h′, i > 0 and we show that
h2 with h1(∼TsA )∗h′ ∼Tsa h2 for a ∈ A satisfies the property of the lemma.
Case: h′ ∈ i and h2 ∈ i . By definition rel(h′) ≈Ma rel(h2) and by induction
rel(h1)(≈MA )∗rel(h′); hence, rel(h1)(≈MA )∗rel(h2).
Case: h′ ∈ i and h2 ∈ i+1. By induction, rel(h1)(≈MA )∗rel(h′) and in particu-
lar, lastr(h1) ∼∗A lastr(h′). By Lemma 4 lastr(h′) ∼Ma rel(h2). This shows that,
lastr(h1)(∼MA )∗rel(h2) ∼Ma lastr(ref (h2)).
Case: h′ ∈ i and h2 ∈ i−1. By definition h2 ∼TsA ref (h′) and rel(h′) ∼MA lastr(h2);
hence, rel(h′) ∈ StM. Thus, by induction rel(h1)(∼MA )∗rel(h′) and by Lemma 4
rel(h′) ∼Ma lastr(h2). This shows that rel(h1)(∼MA )∗lastr(h2).
Case: h′ ∈ i−1 and h2 ∈ i−1. Follows immediately.
Case: h′ ∈ i−1 and h2 ∈ i . We have rel(h1)(∼MA )∗lastr(h′). By Lemma 4 rel(h2) ∼Ma
lastr(h′) and hence rel(h1)(∼MA )∗rel(h2). The claim follows as rel(h1), rel(h2) ∈ StM.
Cases where h′ ∈  j and h2 ∈ k with | j − k| > 1 are not possible due to Lemma 5. unionsq
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Lemma 7 For all q in M and all i, j ∈ N0 with i = j we have that iM(q) ∩  jM(q) = ∅.
Lemma 8 Let M be an iCGS, q a state in it, and a ∈ Agt. Every relation ∼Ts (M,q)a is an
equivalence relation.
Proof We write Ts for Ts(M, q). Reflexivity and symmetry of epistemic relations in Ts are
clear from the definition of isR-pando unfoldings, but we need to prove transitivity. Suppose
that h1 ∼Tsa h2 and h2 ∼Tsa h3. We have to show that h1 ∼Tsa h3. The proof is done by
induction on the level i . The base case for 0 is clear from the transitivity of the standard
indistinguishability relation ≈Ma . By Lemma 5 (and the symmetry of ∼Ts ) it is sufficient to
consider the following cases (we assume that i > 0):
h1, h2, h3 ∈ i : Follows by the transitivity of ≈Ma (induction hypothesis).
h1, h2 ∈ i , h3 ∈ i+1: From h1 ∼Tsa h2 it follows that rel(h1) ≈Ma rel(h2); and
from h2 ∼Tsa h3 that ref (h3) ∼Tsa h2 and lastr(ref (h3)) ∼Ma rel(h3). Furthermore,
because ref (h3) ∈ i we can deduce from the transitivity of ∼Tsa (and by induction) that
ref (h3) ∼Tsa h1 and hence h3 ∼Tsa h1 by definition.
h1 ∈ i , h2, h3 ∈ i+1: We have that ref (h2) ∼Tsa h1 and lastr(ref (h2)) ∼Tsa rel(h2)
and jump(h2) = a. Then, we also have that rel(h2) ≈Tsa rel(h3) and jump(h3) =
jump(h2) = a and ref (h2) ∼Tsa ref (h3) proving that also h1 ∼Tsa h3 by induction.
h1, h3 ∈ i , h2 ∈ i+1: We have that ref (h2) ∼Tsa h1 and lastr(ref (h2)) ∼Tsa rel(h2)
and jump(h2) = a and ref (h2) ∼Tsa h3 and thus h1 ∼Tsa h3 (by induction).
h1, h3 ∈ i+1, h2 ∈ i : We have that ref (h1) ∼Tsa h2 and lastr(ref (h1)) ∼Tsa rel(h1)
and jump(h1) = a and ref (h3) ∼Tsa h2 lastr(ref (h3)) ∼Tsa rel(h3) and jump(h3) = a.
But then by induction ref (h1) ∼Tsa ref (h3) and rel(h1) ∼Ma rel(h3) which shows that
h1 ∼Tsa h3. unionsq
Proposition 8 The isR-pando unfolding of a pointed iCGS is isR-pando-like.
Proof Let M be an iCGS and Ts its isR-pando unfolding. For each h ∈ St′ with |rel(h)| = 1
we define Sth as the set of states/histories in St′ reachable from h, i.e. Sth = {h′ ∈ St′ |
ρTs (h, h′) = }. Let Mh denote the submodel of Ts which does only consist of states Sth
and in which the domain of all elements is restricted to Sth . Moreover, we take I = {h ∈ St |
|rel(h)| = 1}.
Claim: We have that St′ = ⊎h∈I Sth and each Mh is ioR-tree-like.
Proof of claim: Clearly, all sets Sth are mutually disjoint and each h ∈ St has to occur in
some Sth . It is also obvious that each Mh has tree-structure. Now suppose h1, h2 ∈ Sth with
h1 ∼Tsa h2; then, by definition also h1 ≈Ma h2.
We proceed with the main proof and define ∼ˆa as the subset of ∼Tsa which exists between
sets Sth and Sth′ with h = h′. From Lemma 8 it follows that ∼Tsa is transitive and that ∼ˆa is
symmetric. Moreover, by definition ∼ˆa ∩ (Sth × Sth) = ∅ for all h ∈ St′.
The fourth condition of Definition 16 is obvious from the definition of the isR-pando
unfolding. It remains to show the fifth condition of Definition 16. Suppose h1, h′1 ∈ Sth¯1 and
h1(∼Agt)∗h′1. Then, also h1, h′1 ∈ i for some i . From Lemma 6 we obtain that rel(h1)(≈MAgt
)∗rel(h′1), i.e. that both nodes reside on the same level. unionsq
The following two lemmata are needed to prove Theorem 3. The first lemma states that the
set of epistemic alternatives to any state is the same in the model and in the pando unfolding.
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Lemma 9 Let M be an iCGS and q0 a state in it. Then, the following property holds: For
all A ⊆ Agt and all nodes h in Ts(M, q0) we have that {q | lastr(h) ∼MA q, q ∈ StM} =
{lastr(h′) | h′ ∼Ts (M,q0)A h, h′ ∈ StTs (M,q0)}.
Proof “⊆”: Suppose h = h′q ′ ∈ iM(q0) and q ′ ∼MA q and h′ =  (the case for h′ = 
is clear). Then, there is some a ∈ A with q ′ ∼Ma q and thus h′′ := hˆaˆq ∈ i+1M (q0) ⊆
StTs (M,q0) with hˆ ∼Tsa h by definition of the  jM’s. By Definition 17 also h′′ ∼Ts (M,q0)A h.
The claim follows as lastr(h′′) = q .
“⊇”: Suppose h′ ∼Ts (M,q0)A h and h′ ∈ StTs (M,q0). The claim is clear if h, h′ ∈ iM(q0).
According to Definition 17 the remaining case is when h ∈ iM(q) and h′ ∈ i+1M (q), or the
roles of h and h′ switched. Then, h′ = hˆaˆq , hˆ ∼Tsa h for some a ∈ Agt and lastr(hˆ) ∼Ma q .
The claim follows as lastr(h′) = q and lastr(h) ∼MA q . unionsq
The next lemma is needed to show that the witnessing strategy which we shall construct
in the invariance Theorem 3 is uniform.
Lemma 10 Let M be an iCGS, q a state in it, Ts = Ts(M, q), h, hˆ1, hˆ2 ∈ StTs , A ⊆ Agt,
and a ∈ Agt. If hˆ1 ∼TsA h ∼TsA hˆ2 and h1 = hˆ1hF1 ∼a hˆ2hF2 = h2 with hF1 , hF2 ∈ Λ f in;
then, (rel(h1) ≈Ma rel(h2), ρ(hˆ1, h1) ≈Ma ρ(hˆ2, h2) and |hF1 | = |hF2 |), or hF1 = hF2 = .
Proof Suppose hˆ1 ∼Tsb h ∼Tsc hˆ2 with b, c ∈ A. From Lemma 3 we obtain ρ(hˆ1, h1) ≈Ma
ρ(hˆ2, h2) by taking qˆi = hˆi and qi = hi and q = h for i = 1, 2.
To prove the lemma, we firstly assume that h1, h2 ∈ i for some i ∈ N0. Then, by
definition rel(h1) ≈Ma rel(h2) and the claim follows.
Secondly, suppose w.l.o.g. h1 ∈ i and h2 ∈ i+1 for some i ∈ N0. In this case
rel(h2) ∈ St and thus hF2 =  and ρ(hˆ2, h2) = rel(h2) ≈Ma ρ(hˆ1, h1). The latter implies
that |ρ(hˆ1, h1)| = 1 and hence hF1 = . unionsq
Theorem 3 For every iCGS M, state q in M, and ATL∗-formula ϕ, it holds that
M, q |isR ϕ iff Ts(M, q), q |isR ϕ iff Ts(M, q), q |isr ϕ.
Proof We show that for every node h in Ts := Ts(M, q) it holds that M, lastr(h) |isR ϕ iff
Ts(M, q), h |isr ϕ. Then, the claim follows from Propositions 7 and 8 for h = q . The proof
is done by induction on the structure of ϕ and is similar to the proof given for Theorem 2.
Base cases:
Propositional case: Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ where γ contains no nested strategic modalities.
“⇒”: Suppose we have M, lastr(h) |isR 〈〈A〉〉γ and let sA be an i R-strategy with
() ∀λ ∈ out isM(lastr(h), sA) : M, λ |isR γ.
We construct the ir-strategy s′A in Ts(M, q) as follows: for all hˆ ∈ StTs with h ∼TsA hˆ and
all hF ∈ Λ f inM (lastr(hˆ)) we set
s′a(hˆ(hF [1,∞])) := sa(hF ).
We note that we have to exclude the first state in hF because it is already contained in
hˆ. For all other histories h′′ (which do not have the prescribed form) we define s′a(h′′)
arbitrarily but in a uniform way. The setting is illustrated in Fig. 16.
123
Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst (2014) 28:474–518 515
Fig. 16 Setting of the proof of
Theorem 3
Clearly, we have that each hˆ(hF [1,∞]) is a valid state in Ts and by Lemma 10, s′a is
well-defined: Suppose, there are h1 = hˆ1hF1 and h2 = hˆ2hF2 with h1 = h2. Then, also
h1 ∼Tsa h2 and by Lemma 10 hF1 = hF2 which shows that s′a(h1) = s′a(h2).
In the following we show that s′a is uniform. Let h1 and h2 be two histories with h1 ∼Tsa h2.
1. Assume that both nodes have the form from above, i.e. h1 = hˆ1hF1 , h1 = hˆ1hF1 and
h1 ∼TsA h ∼TsA h2. Then, uniformity follows from Lemma 10.
2. Choices for two histories h1 and h2 where at least one does not have the required
form can be defined in a uniform way by definition because ∼Tsa is an equivalence
relation.
Finally, we show that the sets of outcome paths are isomorphic wrt. both strategies. By
Lemma 9 we have that for all states q0 in M the following holds q0 ∼MA lastr(h) iff there
is a history h′ with h′ ∼TsA h and lastr(h′) = q0. We denote one of these histories h′ by
h(q0). Then, by construction of s′A we have that
q0q1q2 · · · ∈ out isM(last (h), sA)
iff (h′)(h′q1)(h′q1q2) · · · ∈ outisTs (M,q)(h, s′A)
for some h′ = h(q0).
Since the valuation of propositions does only depend on the final state of a history and
by () we have Ts(M, q), h |isr 〈〈A〉〉γ .
⇐: For the other direction, suppose we have Ts(M, q), h |isr 〈〈A〉〉γ . So, there is an
ir-strategy sA such that
() ∀λ ∈ out isTs (M,q)(h, sA) : Ts(M, q), λ |isr γ.
We construct a witnessing iR-strategy s′A in M as follows: s′a(hF ) = sa(hˆaˆhF ) for every
a ∈ A, hˆ ∼TsA h for hF ∈  f in(q ′) with q ′ ∼MA lastr(h) and arbitrary but in a uniform
way for all other histories. It is easy to verify that each strategy s′a is uniform and well-
defined. Moreover, s′A yields an equivalent (apart from the notational differences) set of
outcome paths as above. We have M, lastr(h) |isR 〈〈A〉〉γ .
Induction step:
Case: ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2. Straightforward.
Case: ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . M, lastr(h) |isR ¬ψ iff not M, lastr(h) |isR ψ iff (by induction
hypothesis) not Ts(M, q), h |isR ψ iff Ts(M, q), h |isR ¬ψ .
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Case: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉γ . By induction hypothesis we have for each history h in Ts(M, q) and
each strict state-subformula ϕ′ of γ that M, lastr(h) |isR ϕ′ iff Ts(M, q), h |isr ϕ′.
For any maximal strict state-subformula ϕ′ we label all states h in Ts(M, q) and states
lastr(h) in M with a new proposition pϕ′ iff ϕ′ holds in this very state. Then, we replace
each ϕ′ in ϕ with proposition pϕ′ and the claim follows by induction. unionsq
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